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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the EPD&C/RMS FMEA CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SU_q,_Y
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for preparation of _TEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical
Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)/Remote Manipulator System
(RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential
critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the
EPD&C/RMS hardware initially generated three hundred and forty-
five (345) failure mode worksheets and identified one hundred and
seventeen (117) Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting
the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to
the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of one hundred and thirty-
two (132) FMEAs and sixty-six (66) CIL items, which were
generated using the NSTS-22206 FMEA/CIL instructions. IOA
generated failure mode analysis worksheets for both port and
starboard Remote Manipulator Systems whereas the NASA generated
FMEAs for only one system (did not specify which). The IOA
analysis was performed on a component level for components
assigned reference designator numbers on the drawings with one
component per worksheet. The NASA analysis was performed with
like multiple similar components on one FMEA. In some cases the
NASA FMEAs were generated for an entire circuit without
necessarily specifying the components included in the circuit by
any identification number, thus direct comparisons of the IOA and
NASA analyses were not meaningful in the sense of numbers of
failures and identification of criticalities that have any
uniformity. Efforts to compare the two analyses required
consolidation of components in all but a few cases where the
items were single point failure items as some of the switches
were found to be. Twenty-eight (28) additional IOA failure mode
analysis worksheets were generated to facilitate comparison.
Upon completion of the assessment, five (5) issue items were
identified that involved critical items where IOA recommends that
NASA FMEAs generated for that failure mode of the component or
where the NASA Criticality for that failure mode of that
component be upgraded. There were also six (6) issues identified
where IOA recommends upgrading of the NASA assigned criticality
but these are not critical items list candidates.
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Some of the miscompares arose due to differences between the NASA
and IOA FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an
older ground rules document which has since been superseded by
the NSTS 22206 used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no
other discrepancies found that were not already identified by
NASA, and the remaining issues may be attributed to differences
in ground rules.
It may be noted that numerical values appear to disagree between
charts and tables. Figure 1 "Remote Manipulator Arm" block lists
5 issues for FMEAs and 5 issues for CIL items. The FMEA issues
are also CIL issues. Figure 1 "Arm/Shoulder Jettison" block
lists 6 FMEA issues which are not considered critical items.
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EPD&C/RMS ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
EPD&C/RMS ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
IOA NASA 18SUES
I=MEA 388 132 11
CIL 124 66 5
RBIOTE MANIFULATOR ARM
IOA NASA ISSUES
RMEA 54 25 5
CIL 33 16 5
_TOR DEPLOY CONTROL
t RMEA 80 18 0
I CIL 13 7 0
] I _TOR LATCH CONTROLNASA I_SUESI I=MEA 143 18 0
I (::IL 6 7 0
I ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON i
IOA NASA ISSUES
FME 91 71 6
72 37 0
Figure 1 - EPD&C/RMS FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2 • 1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
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2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. The EPD&C/RMS specific ground rules and
assumptions are defined in paragraph B.3 of Appendix B.
3 • 0 8UB8YSTEM DESCRZI_ZON
3.1 Design and Function
The EPD&C/RMS subsystem provides the electrical power and power
control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control,
and stow one port and one starboard RMS. The EPD&C/RMS is a
subset of the Orbiter EPD&C subsystem and uses the same three
main busses and the same type of distribution and control
hardware that is used to supply electrical power to the rest of
the space shuttle subsystems. In addition, electrical power and
control circuitry is provided to guillotine the appropriate
cabling and jettison either or both the remote manipulator arms
in the event it becomes necessary for crew/vehicle safety•
Although the EPD&C/RMS subsystem is designed to supply the
required electrical power to both a port and a starboard RMS on a
given mission, only one RMS can be powered-on at a given time.
The port and starboard RMSs are essentially mirror images of one
another. Some of the EPD&C/RMS electrical power control
switches are common to both the port and starboard systems and
some switches are dedicated to one or the other RMS. The port
and starboard EPD&C/RMS subsystems are essentially identical in
design. The port and starboard systems do differ in that power
and control bus assignments are not the same for both systems.
The EPD&C/RMS subsystem consists of the following subdivisions:
le The EPD&C/RMS Remote Manipulator Arm (05-6IA)
subdivision consists of the hardware to provide
Main Bus 28 volts Direct Current (DC) and 115 volts,
three-phase (3-PH) and single-phase (1-PH), 400 Hertz
(Hz) Alternating Current (AC) primary and backup
(standby redundant) power to both the port and starboard
(only one at a time) Remote Manipulator Arms for
operation of its control electronics, heaters, lights
and drive motors.
• The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Deploy Control (05-6I)
subdivision consists of the hardware to provide
Main Bus 28 volts DC and 115 volts, 3-phase (3-PH),
400 Hz AC power to the Motor Control Assemblies (MCAs)
to control power to the two electrical motors that drive
the actuator to physically drive the appropriate
Manipulator Positioning Mechanism (MPM) to stow or
deploy the port and starboard Remote Manipulator Arms.
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3.1 Design and Function cont,d
• The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Latch Control (05-6IC)
subdivision consists of the hardware to provide
Main Bus 28 volts DC and 115 volts, 3-phase (3-PH),
400 Hz AC power to the MCAs to control power to the
three sets of electrical motor pairs that drive the
retention latch actuators to release or latch position.
There are three retention latch mechanisms with one
located at each of the forward, mid, and aft positions
for the port arm and another set for the starboard arm.
• The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison and
Retention Arm Jettison (05-6ID) subdivision consists of
the hardware to provide the 28 volts DC and control
switching to safely arm and fire the Pyro Initiator
Controllers (PICs) that enable detonation of the
explosives to guillotine the necessary RMS cables and
jettison either or both the port and/or starboard arms
if it becomes necessary for crew/vehicle safety.
3.2 Xntezfaces and Locations
The remote manipulator arm is attached to the Orbiter longeron
(port, starboard, or both) through a roll-out deployment
mechanism. The RMS is operated by a crewmember using direct
viewing and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) from the Display and
Control (D&C) station on the aft flight deck. Most of the
EPD&C/RMS switches are located on panels ASA2 and AI4. The
Payload Bay Mechanical (PLBM) power switches that control the
power to the Motor Control Assemblies are located on panel RI3AI
in the cockpit and the circuit breakers are located on the
standard circuit breaker panels•
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the Hierarchy of the EPD&C/RMS and the
corresponding subdivisions• The subdivisions are represented in
Figures 3 through 6.
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Figure 2 - EPD&C/RMS SUBSYSTEM (05-6I) OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 - EPD&C/RMS REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM (05-6IA)
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Figure 5 - EPD&C/RMS MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL (05-6IC)
z
O
(.,
__
_o
ii
u. O0
un u_
Z
O O
Figure 6 - EPD&C/RMS MANIPULATOR ARM SHOULDER JETTISON
AND RETENTION ARM JETTISON (05-6ID)
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the EPD&C/RMS hardware initially generated
three hundred and forty-five (345) failure mode worksheets and
identified one hundred and seventeen (117) Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These
analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L
baseline of one hundred and thirty-two (132) FMEAs and sixty-six
(66) CIL items, which were generated using the NSTS-22206
FMEA/CIL instructions. IOA generated failure mode analysis
worksheets for both port and starboard Remote Manipulator Systems
whereas the NASA generated FMEAs foronly one system (did not
specify which). The IOA analysis was performed on a component
level for components assigned reference designator numbers on the
drawings with one component per worksheet. The NASA analysis was
performed with like multiple similar components on one FMEA. In
some cases the NASA FMEAs were generated for an entire circuit
without necessarily specifying the components included in the
circuit by any identification number, thus direct comparisons of
the IOA and NASA analyses were not meaningful in the sense of
numbers of failures and identification of criticalities that have
any uniformity. Efforts to compare the two analyses required
consolidation of components in all but a few cases where the
items were single point failure items as some of the switches
were found to be. Twenty-eight (28) additional IOA failure mode
analysis worksheets were generated to facilitate comparison.
Upon completion of the assessment, five (5) issue items were
identified that involved critical items where IOA recommends that
NASA FMEAs generated for that failure mode of the component or
where the NASA Criticality for that failure mode of that
component be upgraded. There were also six (6) issues identified
where IOA recommends upgrading of the NASA assigned criticality
but these are not critical items list candidates.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
I Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment I
I Subdivision NASA IOA Issues I
+ +
05-6IA
05-6IB
05-6IC
05-6ID
TOTAL
25
18
18
71
132
54
8O
143
91
368
5
0
0
6
II
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
I Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment I
I Subdivision NASA IOA Issues
+
05-6IA
05-6IB
05-6IC
05-6ID
TOTAL
15
7
37
66
33
13
6
72
124
5
0
0
0
s I
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA86001-26, Analysis of the EPD&C/RMS Subsystem, 27
February, 1987. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the
NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
I TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities I
i/1
4
I0
0
i0
2/IR
16
1
6
62
2/2
13
2
0
0
3/IR
1
4
4
0
3/2R
8
31
58
13
3/3
12
32
75
6
24 85 15 9 ii0 125
Criticality:
05-6IA
05-6IB
05-6IC
05-6ID
I TOTAL
TOTAL
54
8O
143
91
368 I
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Of the failure modes analyzed, one hundred and twenty-four (124)
were determined to be critical items. A summary of the IOA
recommended critical items is presented in Table IV.
TABLE IV
Criticality:
05-6IA
05-6IB
05-6IC
05-6ID
TOTAL
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
i/I
4
I0
0
i0
2/IR
16
1
6
62
85
_----mmm.
2/2
13
2
0
0
15
3/IR
0
0
0
0
._U--mDm.
3/2R
0
0
0
0
3/3
0
0
0
0
024
TOTAL
33
13
6
72
124
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V. For
convenience Table V is subdivided into V-A thru V-D corresponding
to the four major subdivisions of the EPD&C/RMSSystem.
+
I TABLE V-A IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (i) I
4 ..........
(05-6IA)I Remote Manipulator Arm Components
+
SWITCH, $4
SWITCH, $4
SWITCH, $4
SWITCH, $4
SWITCH, $4
SWITCH, $4
SWITCH, S1
SWITCH, S1
SWITCH, S1
SWITCH, $8
SWITCH, SI0
SWITCHES, $8, SI0
SWITCH, $7
SWITCH, $9
SWITCHES, $7, $9
FUSE, F1
FUSE, F1
FUSE, F2
FUSE, F2
RESISTOR, A3R2 _
,RESISTOR, A3R3
RESISTOR, A2R2
RESISTOR, A2R3
RESISTOR, AIR1
RESISTOR, AIR2
RESISTOR, A3RI
RESISTOR, A2RI
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
RELAY, K1
RELAY, K1
RELAY, K1
RELAY, K2
RELAY, K2
RELAY, K2
FUSE, F26
FUSE, F27
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 27
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 26
ID Number I
÷
RMS-4001
RMS-4002
RMS-4003
RMS-4004
RMS-4005
RMS-4006
RMS-4007
RMS-4008
RMS-4009
RMS-4010
RMS-4011
RMS-4012
RMS-4013
RMS-4014
RMS-4015
RMS-4016
RMS-4017
RMS-4018
RMS-4019
RMS-4020
RMS-4021
RMS-4022
RMS-4023
RMS-4024
RMS-4025
RMS-4026
RMS-4027
RMS-4028
RMS-4029
RMS-4030
RMS-4031
RMS-4032
RMS-4033
RMS-4034
RMS-4035
RMS-4036
RMS-4037
RMS-4038
RMS-4039
RMS-4040
RMS-4041
RMS-4042
RMS-4043
16
TABLE V-A IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (Concluded)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 31
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30
Remote Manipulator Arm Components
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 28
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 29
SWITCH, $4
RESISTOR, A2R2, A2R3, A3R2, A3R3
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 1 PH 3A RMS, BACKUP POWER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 26, 27, 28, 29
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30, RPC 31
(05-6IA)
(2)
RMS-4044
RMS-4045
RMS-4046
ID NUMBER
RMS-4047
RMS-4048
RMS-4049X
RMS-4050X
RMS-4051X
RMS-4052X
RMS-4053X
RMS-4054X
TABLE V-B IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS
I Manipulator Deploy Control Components
4
(05-6IB)
SWITCH, S1
SWITCH, S1
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $5
SWITCH, $5
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
FUSE, F6
FUSE, F5
FUSE, FII
FUSE, FI0
HYBRID RELAY, K72
HYBRID RELAY, K72
HYBRID RELAY, K49
HYBRID RELAY, K49
HYBRID RELAY, K60
HYBRID RELAY, K60
HYBRID RELAY, K51
HYBRID RELAY, K51
HYBRID RELAY, K22
HYBRID RELAY, K22
HYBRID RELAY, K62
HYBRID RELAY, K62
HYBRID RELAY, K24
HYBRID RELAY, K24
HYBRID RELAY, K50
(1) I
+
ID Number
.--ma--nnm----mn_
RMS-4101
RMS-4102
RMS-4103
RMS-4104
RMS-4105_
RMS-4106
RMS-4107
RMS-4108A
RMS-4108
RMS-4108B
RMS-4108C
RMS-4108D
RMS-4109
RMS-4110
RMS-4111
RMS-4112
RMS-4113
RMS-4114
RMS-4115
RMS-4116
RMS-4117
RMS-4118
RMS-4119
RMS-4120
RMS-4121
RMS-4122
RMS-4123
RMS-4124
RMS-4125
RMS-4126
RMS-4127
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+
TABLE V-B IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (Cont'd)
I Manipulator Deploy Control Components
+
(05-6IB)
HYBRID RELAY, K50
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR9, Ii
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR9, II
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI3, 15
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI3, 15
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR8, i0
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR8, i0
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 14
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 14
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI4, 18
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI4, 18
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR6, 8
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR6, 8
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 16
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 16
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR2, 4
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR2, 4
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB2
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB2
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB7
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB7
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI2
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI2
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB3
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB3
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB9
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB9
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI3
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI3
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $3
SWITCH, $3
SWITCH, $7
SWITCH, $7
SWITCH, $9
SWITCH, $9
SWITCH, S12
SWITCH, S12
SWITCH, S13
SWITCH, S13
RESISTOR, R2
RESISTOR, R3
RESISTOR, R7
RESISTOR, R9
RESISTOR, RI2
RESISTOR, RI3
ID Number I
RMS-4128
RMS-4129
RMS-4130
RMS-4131
RMS-4132
RMS-4133
RMS-4134
RMS-4135
RMS-4136
RMS-4137
RMS-4138
RMS-4139
RMS-4140
RMS-4141
RMS-4142
RMS-4143
RMS-4144
RMS-4145
RMS-4146
RMS-4147
RMS-4148
RMS-4149
RMS-4150
RMS-4151
RMS-4152
RMS-4153
RMS-4154
RMS-4155
RMS-4156
RMS-4157
RMS-4158
RMS-4159
RMS-4160
RMS-4161
RMS-4162
RMS-4163
RMS-4164
RMS-4165
RMS-4166
RMS-4167
RMS-4168
RMS-4169
RMS-4170
RMS-4171
RMS-4172
RMS-4173
RMS-4174
+
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TABLE V-B IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (Concluded)
I Manipulator Deploy Control Components
4
(05-6IB)
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
SWITCH, $2
+
(3) I
ID Number I
RMS-4175X
RMS-4176X
RMS-4177X
RMS-4178X
RMS-4179X
RMS-4180X
RMS-418 iX
RMS-4182X
+
TABLE V-C IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS
I Manipulator Latch Control Components
HYBRID RELAY, K20
HYBRID RELAY, K20
HYBRID RELAY, K52
HYBRID RELAY, K52
HYBRID RELAY, K8
HYBRID RELAY, K8
HYBRID RELAY, K64
HYBRID RELAY, K64
FUSE, F4
FUSE, F6
RESISTOR, R27
RESISTOR, R67
RESISTOR, R28
RESISTOR, R63
RESISTOR, R2
RESISTOR, RI4
RESISTOR, R25
RESISTOR, R32
RESISTOR, R26
RESISTOR, R33
HYBRID DRIVER, AR4
HYBRID DRIVER, AR4
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0
HYBRID DRIVER, AR5
HYBRID DRIVER, AR5
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI3
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI3
FUSE, AR4FI
FUSE, ARIOFI
FUSE, AR5FI
FUSE, ARI3FI
HYBRID RELAY, K55
HYBRID RELAY, K55
HYBRID RELAY, K69
(") I
+
(05-6IC) ID Number I
+
RMS-4201
RMS-4202
RMS-4203
RMS-4204
RMS-4205
RMS-4206
RMS-4207
RMS-4208
RMS-4211
RMS-4212
RMS-4213
RMS-4214
RMS-4215
RMS-4216
RMS-4217
RMS-4218
RMS-4219
RMS-4220
RMS-4221
RMS-4222
RMS-4223
RMS-4224
RMS-4225
RMS-4226
RMS-4227
RMS-4228
RMS-4229
RMS-4230
RMS-4231
RMS-4232
RMS-4233
RMS-4234
RMS-4235
RMS-4236
RMS-4237
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TABLE V-C IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (Cont'd)
I Manipulator Latch Control Components
+
(05-6IC)
HYBRID RELAY, K69
HYBRID RELAY, K43
HYBRID RELAY, K43
HYBRID RELAY, K57
HYBRID RELAY, K57
FUSE, F2
FUSE, F4
RESISTOR, R29
RESISTOR, R65
RESISTOR, R28
RESISTOR, R61
RESISTOR, R1
RESISTOR, RII
RESISTOR, R25
RESISTOR, RI4
RESISTOR, R26
RESISTOR, RI5
HYBRID RELAY, K75
HYBRID RELAY, K75
HYBRID RELAY, K78
HYBRID RELAY, K78
HYBRID RELAY, K73
HYBRID RELAY, K73
HYBRID RELAY, K76
HYBRID RELAY, K76
FUSE, F8
FUSE, F2
RESISTOR, R61
RESISTOR, R41
RESISTOR, R62
RESISTOR, R40
RESISTOR, RI4
RESISTOR, R2
RESISTOR, R59
RESISTOR, R31
RESISTOR, R60
RESISTOR, R33
HYBRID RELAY, K54
HYBRID RELAY, K54
HYBRID RELAY, K56
HYBRID RELAY, K56
HYBRID RELAY, K66
HYBRID RELAY, K66
HYBRID RELAY, K44
HYBRID RELAY, K44
FUSE, F7
FUSE, F3
RESISTOR, R68
RESISTOR, R34
ID Number I
RMS-4238
RMS-4239
RMS-4240
RMS-4241
RMS-4242
RMS-4245
RMS-4246
RMS-4247
RMS-4248
RMS-4249
RMS-4250
RMS-4251
RMS-4252
RMS-4253
RMS-4254
RMS-4255
RMS-4256
RMS-4257
RMS-4258
RMS-4259
RMS-4260
RMS-4261
RMS-4262
RMS-4263
RMS-4264
RMS-4267
RMS-4268
RMS-4269
RMS-4270
RMS-4271
RMS-4272
RMS-4273
RMS-4274
RMS-4275
RMS-4276
RMS-4277
RMS-4278
RMS-4279
RMS-4280
RMS-4281
RMS-4282
RMS-4283
RMS-4284
RMS-4285
RMS-4286
RMS-4289
RMS-4290
RMS-4291
RMS-4292
2O
4
TABLE V-C IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (Cont'd)
l Manipulator Latch Control Components
4
(o5-6IC)
RESISTOR, R64
RESISTOR, R33
RESISTOR, RI2
RESISTOR, R2
RESISTOR, R35
RESISTOR, R31
RESISTOR, R34
RESISTOR, R30
HYBRID RELAY, K59
HYBRID RELAY, K59
HYBRID RELAY, K76
HYBRID RELAY, K76
HYBRID RELAY, K71
HYBRID RELAY, K71
HYBRID RELAY, K74
HYBRID RELAY, K74
FUSE, F5,
FUSE, F9
RESISTOR, R66
RESISTOR, R66
RESISTOR, R62
RESISTOR, R67
RESISTOR, RI0
RESISTOR, R2
RESISTOR, RI6
RESISTOR, R64
RESISTOR, RI7
RESISTOR, R65
HYBRID RELAY, K24
HYBRID RELAY, K24
HYBRID RELAY, K27
HYBRID RELAY, K27
HYBRID RELAY, KI2
HYBRID RELAY, KI2
HYBRID RELAY, K29
HYBRID RELAY, K29
FUSE, 2 AMP, F3
FUSE, 2 AMP, F3
RESISTOR, R49
RESISTOR, R22
RESISTOR, R42
RESISTOR, R23
RESISTOR, R2
RESISTOR, R3
RESISTOR, R34
RESISTOR, R33
RESISTOR, R36
RESISTOR, R31
(3) l
I-
ID Number I
RMS-4293
RMS-4294
RMS-4295
RMS-4296
RMS-4297
RMS-4298
RMS-4299
RMS-4300
RMS-4301
RMS-4302
RMS-4303
RMS-4304
RMS-4305
RMS-4306
RMS-4307
RMS-4308
RMS-4311
RMS-4312
RMS-4313
RMS-4314
RMS-4315
RMS-4316
RMS-4317
RMS-4318
RMS-4319
RMS-4320
RMS-4321
RMS-4322
RMS-4323
RMS-4324
RMS-4325
RMS-4326
RMS-4327
RMS-4328
RMS-4329
RMS-4330
RMS-4333
RMS-4334
RMS-4335
RMS-4336
RMS-4337
RMS-4338
RMS-4339
RMS-4340
RMS-4341
RMS-4342
RMS-4343
RMS-4344
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TABLE V-C IOA WORKSHEETNUMBERS(Concluded)
Manipulator Latch Control Components (05-6IC)
FUSE, F3, F4
SWITCH, $6
SWITCH, $6
SWITCH, $6
SWITCH, $6
SWITCH, $6
SWITCH, $6
SWITCH, $6
LIMIT SWITCH, LATCHED & RELEASED
LIMIT SWITCH, RELEASE
LIMIT SWITCH, LATCH
(4)[
ID Number I
b
RMS-4345X
RMS-4346X
RMS-4347X
RMS-4348X
RMS-4349X
RMS-4350X
RMS-4351X
RMS-4352X
RMS-4353X
RMS-4354X
RMS-4355X
TABLE V-D IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS
I Manip Arm Arm/Shldr Retn/Jett Components (05-6ID)
4
RELAY, K44
RELAY, K76
RELAY, K57
RELAY, KS0
RELAY, K77
RELAY, KII
RELAY, K68
RELAY, K58
RELAY, K78
RELAY, K78
RELAY, K23
RELAY, KI7
SWITCH, $21
SWITCH, $21
SWITCH, $28
SWITCH, $28
SWITCH, $25
SWITCH, S25
SWITCH, S32
SWITCH, $32
SWITCH, $24
SWITCH, $24
SWITCH, $31
SWITCH, $31
SWITCH, $23
SWITCH, $23
SWITCH, $30
SWITCH, $30
4
(i) I
+
ID Number ]
+
RMS-4209
RMS-4210
RMS-4243
RMS-4244
RMS-4265
RMS-4266
RMS-4287
RMS-4288
RMS-4309
RMS-4310
RMS-4331
RMS-4332
RMS-4501
P_MS-4502
RMS-4503
RMS-4504
RMS-4505
RMS-4506
RMS-4507
RMS-4508
RMS-4509
RMS-4510
RMS-4511
RMS-4512
RMS-4513
RMS-4514
RMS-4515
RMS-4516
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TABLE V-D IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (Cont'd)
Manip Arm Arm/Shldr Retn/Jett Components (05-6ID)
SWITCH, $22
SWITCH, $22
SWITCH, $29
SWITCH, $29
SWITCH, $33
SWITCH, $33
FUSE, F27
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB27
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB27
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB29
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB29
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB33
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB33
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB32
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB32
PIC 1
PIC 1
PIC 12
PIC 12
PIC I, 12
PIC I, 12
PIC 6
PIC 6
PIC 17
PIC 17
PIC 6, 17
PIC 6, 17
PIC 8
PIC 8
PIC 19
PIC 19
PIC 8, 19
PIC 8, 19
PIC i0
PIC I0
PIC 21
PIC 21
PIC I0, 21
PIC i0, 21
PIC 2
PIC 2
PIC 13
PIC 13
PIC 2, 13
PIC 2, 13
PIC 7
PIC 7
PIC 18
(2) I
ID Number l
RMS-4517
RMS-4518
RMS-4519
RMS-4520
RMS-4521
RMS-4522
RMS-4523
RMS-4524
RMS-4525
RMS-4526
RMS-4527
RMS-4528
RMS-4529
RMS-4530
RMS-4531
RMS-4532
RMS-4533
RMS-4534
RMS-4535
RMS-4536
RMS-4537
RMS-4538
RMS-4539
RMS-4540
RMS-4541
RMS-4542
RMS-4543
RMS-4544
RMS-4545
RMS-4546
RMS-4547
RMS-4548
RMS-4549
RMS-4550
RMS-4551
RMS-4552
RMS-4553
RMS-4554
RMS-4555
RMS-4556
RMS-4557
RMS-4558
RMS-4559
RMS-4560
RMS-4561
RMS-4562
RMS-4563
RMS-4564
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TABLE V-D IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS (Concluded)
I Manip Arm Arm/Shldr Retn/Jett Components (05-6ID)
4
PIC 18
PIC 7, 18
PIC 7, 18
PIC 9
PIC 9
PIC 20
PIC 20
PIC 9, 20
PIC 9, 20
PIC II
PIC II
PIC 22
PIC 22
PIC II, 22
PIC Ii, 22
+
(3)
ID Number
RMS-4565
RMS-4566
RMS-4567
RMS-4568
RMS-4569
RMS-4570
RMS-4571
RMS-4572
RMS-4573
RMS-4574
RMS-4575
RMS-4576
RMS-4577
RMS-4578
RMS-4579
4.1 Assessment Results - EPD&C/RMS Remote Manipulator Arm
Subsystem (05-6IA)
The IOA analYsis of the EPD&C/RMS Remote Manipulator Arm
Subsystem generated forty-eight (48) failure mode worksheets and
identified thirty-one (31) Potential Critical Items before
starting the assessment process. Of the forty-eight (48) IOA
FMEAs, three (3) were Criticality 1/1, fifteen (15) were
Criticality 2/IR and thirteen (13) were Criticality 2/2. The
NASA analysis consisted of twenty- five (25) FMEAs and fifteen
(15) CIL items. Of the fifteen (15) CIL items, six (6)
Criticality 1/1 and nine (9) were Criticality 2/IR. Each
component, the function it performs and the failure modes
identified were re-evaluated and the assessment was performed by
comparison of the IOA FMEA/CILs to the NASA Post 51L FMEA/CILs.
The IOA assessment recommends fifty-four (54) IOA FMEAs be
established with four (4) having Criticality 1/1, sixteen (16)
having Criticality 2/1R, thirteen having Criticality 2/2, one (1)
having Criticality 3/1R, eight (8) having Criticality 3/2R, and
three (3) having Criticality 3/3. The assessment identified
thirty-three (33) Potential Critical Items with four (4) having
Criticality 1/1, sixteen having Criticality 2/1R, and thirteen
(13) having Criticality 2/2. The assessment identified five (5)
issue items. IOA recommends that two (2) NASA FMEAs be generated
with Criticality 2/IR, one (I) NASA FMEA be generated with
Criticality 2/2, and one (1) NASA FMEA Criticality be upgraded to
2/1R from 3/1R and one upgraded from Criticality 2/2 to 2/1R.
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4.2 Assessment Results - EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Deploy Control
Subsystem (05-6IB)
The IOA analysis of the EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Deploy Control
Subsystem generated seventy-four (74) failure mode worksheets and
identified fourteen (14) Potential Critical Items before starting
the assessment process. Of the seventy-four (74) IOA FMEAs, ten
(i0) were Criticality i/i, two (2) were Criticality 2/IR, two (2)
were Criticality 2/2, thirty (30) were Criticality 3/2R, and
thirty (30) were Criticality 3/3. The NASA analysis consisted of
eighteen (18) FMEAs and seven (7) CIL items. Of the seven (7)
CIL items, five (5) were Criticality I/I, and two (2) were
Criticality 2/IR. Each component, the function it performs and
the failure modes identified were re-evaluated and the assessment
was performed by comparison of the IOA FMEA/CILs to the NASA Post
51L FMEA/CILs. The IOA assessment results is eighty (80) IOA
FMEAs with ten (I0) having Criticality i/I, one (I) having
Criticality 2/IR, two (2) having Criticality 2/2, four (4) having
Criticality 3/IR, thirty-one (31) having Criticality 3/2R, and
thirty-two (32) having Criticality 3/3. The assessment
identified thirteen (13) Potential Critical Items with ten (i0)
having Criticality I/I, one (i) having Criticality 2/IR, and two
(2) having Criticality 2/2. The assessment identified no (0)
issue items.
4.3 Assessment Results - EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Latch Control
Subsystem (05-6IC)
The IOA analysis of the EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Latch Control
Subsystem generated one hundred and forty-four (144) failure mode
worksheets and identified no (0) Potential Critical Items before
starting the assessment process. Of the one hundred and fifty-
four (144) IOA FMEAs, seventy (70) were Criticality 3/2R and
seventy-four (74) were Criticality 3/3. The NASA analysis
consisted of eighteen (18) FMEAs and seven (7) CIL items. All of
the seven (7) CIL items, five (5) were Criticality 2/IR. Each
component, the function it performs and the failure modes
identified were re-evaluated and the assessment was performed by
comparison of the IOA FMEA/CILs to the NASA Post 51L FMEA/CILs.
The IOA assessment results is one hundred and forty-three (143)
IOA FMEAs with none (0) having Criticality I/i, six (6 having
Criticality 2/IR, none () having Criticality 2/2, four (4) having
Criticality 3/IR, fifty-eight (58) having Criticality 3/2R, and
seventy-five (75) having Criticality 3/3. The assessment
identified six (6) Potential Critical Items having Criticality
2/IR. The assessment identified no (0) issue items.
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4.4 Assessment Results - EPD&C/RMSShoulder/Retention Arm and
Jettison Subsystem (05-6ID)
The IOA analysis of the EPD&C/RMS Shoulder/Retention Arm and
Jettison Subsystem generated seventy-nine (79) failure mode
worksheets and identified seventy-two (72) Potential Critical
Items before starting the assessment process. Of the seventy-
nine (79) IOA FMEAs, ten (10) were Criticality I/I, sixty-two
were Criticality 2/IR, one (I) was Criticality 3/2R, and six (6)
were Criticality 3/3. The NASA analysis consisted of seventy-one
(71) FMEAs, thirty-seven (37 of which were CIL items. Of the
thirty-seven (37) CIL items, twelve (12) were Criticality I/I and
twenty-five (25) were Criticality 2/IR. Each component, the
function it performs and the failure modes identified were
re-evaluated and the assessment was performed by comparison of
the IOA FMEA/CILs to the NASA Post 51L FMEA/CILs. The IOA
assessment results is ninety-one (91) IOA FMEAs with ten (I0)
having Criticality i/i, sixty-two (62) having Criticality 2/IR,
none () having Criticality 2/2, none () having Criticality 3/IR,
thirteen (13) having Criticality 3/2R, and six (6) having
Criticality 3/3. The assessment identified ten (I0) Potential
Critical Items having Criticality i/I and sixty-two having
Criticality 2/IR. The assessment identified no (0) issue items.
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Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), Oct. i0, 1986
2. JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C,
DCN-5, Sep. 13, 1985
3. VS72-956099, Rockwell International Electrical
Schematics, Remote Manipulator System
•
Rockwell, International Space Division Reliability
Desk Instruction No. 100-2G, Flight Hardware Failure
Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) & Critical Items List
(CIL), January 31, 1984.
27

APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS
AC
AOA
AMP
ATO
CB
CIL
CKT
CUR
DC
EPD&C
FMC
FMEA
FPC
FUNC
FWD
GUILL
HDW
HERM
HW/F
HZ
IOA
JETT
LIM
MCIU
MDAC
MDM
MFR
MMC
MN
MPC
NASA
NSTS
N/A
OA
OF
- Alternating Current
- Abort Once Around
- Ampere
- Abort To Orbit
- Circuit Breaker
- Critical Items List
- Circuit
- Current
- Direct Current
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Forward Motor Controller
- Failure Mode Effects Analysis
- Forward Power Controller
- Functional
- Forward
- Guillotine
- Hardware
- Hermetically
- Hardware/Functional
- Hertz (cycles per second)
- Independent Orbiter Analysis
- Jettison
- Limiting
- Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Manned Foot Restraint
- Mid Motor Controller
- Main 28 VDC Power Bus
- Mid Power Controller
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Not Applicable
- Operational Aft
- Operational Forward
A-I
ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS (Cont,d)
P
PBM
PCA
PCI
PH
PIC
POS
PYRO
RMS
RPC
RTLS
STBD
TAL
VAC
VDC
I-PH
3-PH
- Pass
- Payload Bay Mechanical
- Power Controller Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Phase
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Position
- Pyrotechnic
- Remote Manipulator System
- Remote Power Controller
- Return To Launch Site
- Starboard
- TransAtlantic Abort Landing
- Volts Alternating Current
- Volts Direct Current
- Single Phase
- Three Phase
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFiNiTiONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TA___LL- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT__OO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTiNGENCy CREW pROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___S- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT pHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, 10 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
lo
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings•
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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.•
•
•
i0.
Ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 RMS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level. The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
i. ARMS mission is considered to be uncradling,
grappling a berthed payload, unberthing it, deploying
it and then retrieving a rotating payload, berthing it
and performing MFR operations. Any failure that
prevents the completion of any of these tasks is loss
of mission (i.e. loss of manual augmented modes).
RATIONALE: This is the most demanding nominal RMS
mission possible. This causes the worst
case criticalities for certain failures
because they will prevent the completion of
this mission. If the mission was simpler,
many failures would be a lower criticality.
• Consistency checking and safing is not considered
redundancy for failures that cause uncommanded motion.
RATIONALE: The consistency check and safing are not
redundant for the hardware that when fails
causes uncommanded motion. They are also
only designed to stop the RMS in 2 feet,
which may not prevent collision.
• A Criticality 1 failure is considered to be any failure
that causes uncommanded motion, uncommanded release,
uncommanded derigidization, or loss of capability to
move a joint or any number of joints. It also includes
the loss of the ability to release a payload, and the
payload hanging up in the snares.
RATIONALE: Uncommanded motion in its worst case can
cause the loss of vehicle if the arm or
payload struck a window or damaged the
payload bay doors so they could not close.
Uncommanded release could cause the payload
to hit the Orbiter, uncommanded
derigidization or a payload hanging up in
the snares can cause the unrestrained
payload on the end effector to swing into
the Orbiter• The loss of the ability to
move a joint or release a payload would
mean the RMS could not be cradled which
would prevent the doors from closing.
B-6
•.
•
.
The loss of primary modes will cause loss of mission
(Criticality 2) but backup is considered redundancy for
release of the payload and cradling the RMS for some
failures• Therefore, loss of primary modes is a
criticality 2 as long as backup is available.
RATIONALE: Without primary modes the RMS mission
cannot be accomplished. Backup mode does
not provide enough redundancy to accomplish
the task mentioned in rule i. Backup does
provide some redundancy for failures that
cause loss of payload release or loss of
joint drive. Therefore, the failures that
backup provides redundancy for will be
classified as loss of mission.
For ascent, entry and aborts, the RMS is assumed to be
cradled, latched, and unpowered. Only failures that
can occur while the RMS is in this mode are considered
for those flight phases.
RATIONALE: The RMS is designed for use while onorbit.
During ascent and entry the RMS is latched
and unpowered. No consideration will be
given to failures unless they have an
effect during ascent and entry.
Failure modes are assumed to occur during two arm
operations. If a failure can effect two arms, then the
worst case result of that effect will determine the
criticality•
RATIONALE: The Orbiter is capable of supporting dual
arm operation. If this configuration
proves to be the worst case for a
particular failure, then that will drive
the criticality.
Failures of wire harnesses and bundles (structural
failures, wire to wire shorts, incorrect attachment)
are not considered. Failures of a single wire are
covered by considering loss of input or output from a
component•
RATIONALE: The failure of wire harnesses and bundles
are not being considered because of the
magnitude of possible failures.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASBESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4001
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2028-1X
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4001
ITEM: SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE THREE NASA FMEAs FOR THIS COMPONENT: i) 05-6IA-2028-5
(FAIL OPEN, SHORTED BETWEEN POLES, SHORTED TO GROUND) WITH A CRIT
OF i/i (REFER 4002). 2) 05-6IA-2028-6 (ONE OR MORE SETS OF
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSE) WITH A CRIT OF 2/IR
(REFER 4006). 3) 05-6IA-2028-9 (POLE TO POLE SHORT, CONTACT TO
CONTACT SHORT, SHORT TO CASE) WITH A CRIT OF i/i (REFER 4002).
THE FAILURE MODE IDENTIFIED IN THIS FMEA IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
AND THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION (A SINGLE
SWITCH TO PROVIDE BOTH PRIMARY AND BACKUP POWER). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THESE COMBINED IOA
FAILURE MODES(4001, 4003 AND 4004) WITH THIS CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-2
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4002
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2028-5
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4002
ITEM: SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. NO ISSUE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4003
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2028-1X
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4003
ITEM: SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE THREE NASA FMEAs FOR THIS COMPONENT: i) 05-6IA-2028-5
(FAIL OPEN, SHORTED BETWEEN POLES, SHORTED TO GROUND) WITH A CRIT
OF i/I (REFER 4002). 2) 05-6IA-2028-6 (ONE OR MORE SETS OF
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSE) WITH A CRIT OF 2/IR
(REFER 4006). 3) 05-6IA-2028-9 (POLE TO POLE SHORT, CONTACT TO
CONTACT SHORT, SHORT TO CASE) WITH A CRIT OF i/i (REFER 4002).
THE FAILURE MODE IDENTIFIED IN THIS FMEA IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
AND THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION (A SINGLE
SWITCH TO PROVIDE BOTH PRIMARY AND BACKUP POWER). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THESE COMBINED IOA
FAILURE MODES(4001, 4003 AND 4004) WITH THIS CRITICALITY.
NO ISSUE ON THIS IOA FMEA, REFER TO 4001 FOR RESOLUTION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4004
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2028-1X
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4004
ITEM: SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE THREE NASA FMEAs FOR THIS COMPONENT: i) 05-6IA-2028-5
(FAIL OPEN, SHORTED BETWEEN POLES, SHORTED TO GROUND) WITH A CRIT
OF i/i (REFER 4002). 2) 05-6IA-2028-6 (ONE OR MORE SETS OF
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSE) WITH A CRIT OF 2/IR
(REFER 4006). 3) 05-6IA-2028-9 (POLE TO POLE SHORT, CONTACT TO
CONTACT SHORT, SHORT TO CASE) WITH A CRIT OF I/I (REFER 4002).
THE FAILURE MODE IDENTIFIED IN THIS FMEA IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
AND THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION (A SINGLE
SWITCH TO PROVIDE BOTH PRIMARY AND BACKUP POWER). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THESE COMBINED IOA
FAILURE MODES(4001, 4003 AND 4004) WITH THIS CRITICALITY.
NO ISSUE ON THIS IOA FMEA, REFER TO 4001 FOR RESOLUTION.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4005
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2028-2X
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4005
ITEM: SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE THREE NASA FMEAs FOR THIS COMPONENT: I) 05-6IA-2028-5
(FAIL OPEN, SHORTED BETWEEN POLES, SHORTED TO GROUND) WITH A CRIT
OF i/i (REFER 4002). 2) 05-6IA-2028-6 (ONE OR MORE SETS OF
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSE) WITH A CRIT OF 2/IR
(REFER 4006). 3) 05-6IA-2028-9 (POLE TO POLE SHORT, CONTACT TO
CONTACT SHORT, SHORT TO CASE) WITH A CRIT OF i/i (REFER 4002).
THE FAILURE MODE IDENTIFIED IN THIS FMEA IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
AND THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION (A SINGLE
SWITCH TO PROVIDE BOTH PRIMARY AND BACKUP POWER). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE
AND CRIT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4006
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2028-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4006
ITEM: SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT AND SCREENS OF IOA
FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4007
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2029-5
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4007
ITEM: SWITCH, S1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
B
[ F ]
[ ]
[N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2029-5, FAILURE MODES OF
PREMATURE OPEN, SHORTS TO CASE APPEAR TO BE CREDIBLE.
UPGRADING THE IOA FMEA TO AGREE WITH THE NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
FAILS OPEN,
RECOMMEND
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4008
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2029-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4008
ITEM: SWITCH, S1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4009
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2029-5
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4009
ITEM: SWITCH, S1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C. / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4010
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4010
ITEM: SWITCH, $8
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CORRECT IOA SCREENS. $7 IN RMS-4013, $8 IN RMS-4010, $9 IN RMS-
4014, SI0 IN RMS-4011. ALL 4 FMEAS ARE ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL.
IOA RECOMMENDS ONE FMEA FOR FOUR IDENTICAL SWITCHES AS IN NASA
FMEA. IOA CONCURS THAT SCREENS SHOULD BE AS PER NASA
FMEA.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4011
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4011
ITEM: SWITCH, SI0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CORRECT IOA FMEA SCREENS. $7 IN RMS-4013, $8 IN RMS-4010, $9 IN
RMS-4014, SI0 IN RMS-4011. ALL 4 FMEAS ARE ESSENTIALLY
IDENTICAL. IOA RECOMMENDS ONE FMEA FOR FOUR IDENTICAL SWITCHES
AS IN NASA FMEA. IOA CONCURS THAT SCREENS SHOULD BE AS PER NASA
FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4012
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2026-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4012
SWITCHES, $8, SIO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE CRIT OF IOA FMEA, COMBINE IOA COMPONENTS NASA ANALYSIS
STATES THAT CONTINUOUSLY POWERING HEATING ELEMENTS COULD INCREASE
TEMPERATURES SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT RMS JOINT MOVEMENTS. IT
WOULD APPEAR THE FAILURE MODE IS CREDIBLE (ALBEIT UNLIKELY)
THEREFORE IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND COMBINING 4012
AND 4015.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4013
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2026-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4013
ITEM: SWITCH, $7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C N ] C N ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CORRECT IOA SCREEN, COMBINE IOA FMEAS $7 IN RMS-4013, $8 IN RMS-
4010, $9 IN RMS-4014, SI0 IN RMS-4011. ALL 4 FMEAS ARE
ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL. IOA RECOMMENDS ONE FMEA FOR FOUR
IDENTICAL SWITCHES AS IN POST FMEA. IOA CONCURS THAT THE
SCREENS SHOULD BE AS PER NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4014
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2026-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4014
ITEM: SWITCH, $9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
[ F ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA SCREEN, COMBINE IOA FMEAS $7 IN RMS-4013,
$8 IN RMS-4010, $9 IN RMS-4014, SI0 IN RMS-4011. ALL 4 FMEAS ARE
ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL. IOA RECOMMENDS ONE FMEA FOR FOUR
IDENTICAL SWITCHES AS IN POST FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4015
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4015
SWITCHES, $7, $9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DOWNGRADE IOA CRIT, CHANGE IOA SCREENS, COMBINE IOA FMEAS POST
ANALYSIS STATES THAT CONTINUOUSLY POWERING HEATING ELEMENTS COULD
INCREASE TEMPERATURES SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT RMS JOINT
MOVEMENTS. IT WOULD APPEAR THE FAILURE MODE IS CREDIBLE (ALBEIT
UNLIKELY) THEREFORE IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND
COMBINING RMS-4012 AND RMS-4015 INTO RMS-4012 WITH THE
APPROPRIATE SCREENS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4016
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2003-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4016
ITEM: FUSE, F1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FAILURE MODES. NO ISSUE. THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE
REDUNDANT TO RMS-4017. REFERENCE NSTS 22206 PAR 2.3.4B FOR BLANK
REDUNDANCY SCREEN REQUIREMENT SINCE RMS-4017 FAILS THE FUSE OPEN
AT A MORE CRITICAL TIME WITH A CRIT 2/IR, AND THIS FAILURE
DIFFERS ONLY IN THAT IT OCCURS AT A LESS CRITICAL TIME, IOA
RECOMMENDS IT BE ABSORBED INTO RMS-4017.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4017
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4017
ITEM: FUSE, F1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
MOTION WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE POSSIBLY CATASTROPHIC.
UPGRADE IOA CRIT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4018
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4018
ITEM: FUSE, F2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FAILURE MODES. NO ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS
FMEA BE COMBINED WITH RMS-4019.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4019
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4019
ITEM: FUSE, F2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE NASA CRIT, CORRECT IOA SCREENS, COMBINE IOA FMEAS.
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANT
ITEMS. CHANGE IOA SCREEN C TO "P". IOA SCREENS SHOULD BE 1 -
N/A - P. BACKUP POWER WOULD ONLY BE USED AFTER PRIMARY FAILURE.
LOSS OF BACKUP POWER UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE IF ARM CANNOT BE SAFELY STOWED OR JETTISONED. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT RMS-4018 BE COMBINED WITH THIS FMEA WITH CHANGED
SCREENS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4020
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4020
RESISTOR, A3R2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FMEAS AND UPGRADE CRIT AND SCREENS. NASA FMEA
COMBINES STARBOARD AND PORT COMPONENTS ON THE SAME FMEA. FOR
REALISTIC ASSESSMENT, IOA CONCURS TO COMBINE IOA FMEAs 4021, 4022
AND 4023 AND UPGRADE CRITs AND SCREENS ACCORDINGLY.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4021
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4021
RESISTOR, A3R3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
[F] [P] [X]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
COMBINE IOA FMEAS AND UPGRADE CRIT AND SCREENS. NASA FMEA
COMBINES STARBOARD AND PORT COMPONENTS ON THE SAME FMEA. FOR
REALISTIC ASSESSMENT, IOA CONCURS TO COMBINE IOA FMEAS 4021, 4022
AND 4023 AND UPGRADE CRITS AND SCREENS ACCORDINGLY.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4022
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4022
RESISTOR, A2R2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
[F] [P] [X]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FMEAS AND UPGRADE CRIT AND SCREENS. NASA FMEA
COMBINES STARBOARD AND PORT COMPONENTS ON THE SAME FMEA. FOR
REALISTIC ASSESSMENT, IOA CONCURS TO COMBINE IOA FMEAS 4021, 4022
AND 4023 AND UPGRADE CRITS AND SCREENS ACCORDINGLY.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4023
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2076-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4023
RESISTOR, A2R3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FMEAS AND UPGRADE CRIT AND SCREENS. NASA FMEA
COMBINES STARBOARD AND PORT COMPONENTS ON THE SAME FMEA. FOR
REALISTIC ASSESSMENT, IOA CONCURS TO COMBINE IOA FMEAS 4021, 4022
AND 4023 AND UPGRADE CRITS AND SCREENS ACCORDINGLY.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4024
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4024
RESISTOR, AIR1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA COMPONENTS. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2078-I HAS THE FOUR
RESISTORS LISTED IN REF DESIGNATOR. IOA FMEA 4024 FAILS RESISTOR
AIR2. IOA FMEA 4025 FAILS RESISTOR AIR2. IOA FMEA 4026 FAILS
RESISTOR A3RI. IOA FMEA 4027 FAILS
RESISTOR A2RI. RECOMMEND COMBING IOA FMEA COMPONENTS TO AGREE
WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4025
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4025
RESISTOR, AIR2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA COMPONENTS. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2078-I HAS THE FOUR
RESISTORS LISTED IN REF DESIGNATOR. IOA FMEA 4024 FAILS RESISTOR
AIR2. IOA FMEA 4025 FAILS RESISTOR AIR2. IOA FMEA 4026 FAILS
RESISTOR A3RI. IOA FMEA 4027 FAILS
RESISTOR A2RI. RECOMMEND COMBING IOA FMEA COMPONENTS TO AGREE
WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4026
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4026
RESISTOR, A3RI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA COMPONENTS. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2078-I HAS THE FOUR
RESISTORS LISTED IN REF DESIGNATOR. IOA FMEA 4024 FAILS RESISTOR
AIR2. IOA FMEA 4025 FAILS RESISTOR AIR2. IOA FMEA 4026 FAILS
RESISTOR A3RI. IOA FMEA 4027 FAILS
RESISTOR A2RI. RECOMMEND COMBING IOA FMEA COMPONENTS TO AGREE
WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4027
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2078-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4027
RESISTOR, A2RI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA COMPONENTS. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2078-I HAS THE FOUR
RESISTORS LISTED IN REF DESIGNATOR. IOA FMEA 4024 FAILS RESISTOR
AIR2. IOA FMEA 4025 FAILS RESISTOR AIR2. IOA FMEA 4026 FAILS
RESISTOR A3RI. IOA FMEA 4027 FAILS
RESISTOR A2RI. RECOMMEND COMBING IOA FMEA COMPONENTS TO AGREE
WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4028
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4028
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. COMBINE IOA FMEAS. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THIS
FAILURE MODE INTO RMS-2029.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4029
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4029
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ 1 ] [ N/] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
GENERATE NASA FMEA, CHANGE IOA SCREENS, COMBINE IOA FMEAs. LOSS
OF PRIMARY AC PWR WITH ARM IN USE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIMARY
MODE OF OPERATION, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE
IN THE BACKUP SYSTEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF
THE ARM COULD NOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED. IOA REDUNDANCY
SCREENS SHOULD READ: A=I B=N/A C=P.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4030
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2006-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4030
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4031
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4031
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FAILURE MODES. RECOMMEND COMBINING THIS MODE WITH
RMS-4032 (HAS HIGHER CRIT).
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4032
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4032
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ 1 ] [ N/] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA C SCREEN SHOULD BE "P" AND IOA SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE
SINCE BACKUP AC POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT PER NSTS 22206.
SCREENS SHOULD BE 1 - N/A - P. RECOMMEND THIS FMEA BE COMBINED
WITH RMS-4031. RECOMMEND THE NASA FMEA BE CHANGED TO AGREE WITH
THE
MODIFICATIONS TO THIS FMEA. LOSS OF BACKUP AC POWER WHILE IN
OPERATION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM COULD NOT BE
SAFELY STOWED OR JETTISONED.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4033
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4033
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO ISSUE.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4034
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4034
ITEM: RELAY, K1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2126-I HAS BOTH K1 AND K2 WITH FAILURE MODES
"FAIL OPEN', "SHORT TO GROUND'. IOA FMEAS 4034 AND 4035 HAVE K1
FAILING OPEN AT DIFFERENT TIMES WITH CRITS 2/2 AND 2/IR
RESPECTIVELY. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOUR IOA FMEAs
4034, 4035, 4037 AND 4038 INTO ONE FMEA WITH A i/i CRIT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4035
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2126-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4035
ITEM: RELAY, K1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2126-I HAS BOTH K1 AND K2 WITH FAILURE MODES
"FAIL OPEN', "SHORT TO GROUND'. IOA FMEAS 4034 AND 4035 HAVE K1
FAILING OPEN AT DIFFERENT TIMES WITH CRITS 2/2 AND 2/IR
RESPECTIVELY. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOUR IOA FMEAs
4034, 4035, 4037 AND 4038 INTO ONE FMEA WITH A i/I CRIT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/99
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4036
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4036
ITEM: RELAY, K1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
C N ] C N ] C N ]
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA FMEA CRIT. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2126-2 HAS BOTH K1 AND
K2 FAIL WITH INADVERTENT OUTPUT. IOA FMEAS 4036 AND 4039 HAVE K1
FAILING CLOSED. RECOMMEND COMBINING BOTH RELAYS ON 4036 WITH THE
FAILURE MODES IN AGREEMENT WITH NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-37
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4037
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4037
ITEM: RELAY, K2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2126-I HAS BOTH K1 AND K2 WITH FAILURE MODES
"FAIL OPEN', "SHORT TO GROUND'. IOA FMEAS 4034 AND 4035 HAVE K1
FAILING OPEN AT DIFFERENT TIMES WITH CRITS 2/2 AND 2/IR
RESPECTIVELY. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOUR IOA FMEAs
4034, 4035, 4037 AND 4038 INTO ONE FMEA WITH A i/i CRIT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-38
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4038
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4038
ITEM: RELAY, K2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2126-I HAS BOTH K1 AND K2 WITH FAILURE MODES
"FAIL OPEN', "SHORT TO GROUND'. IOA FMEAS 4034 AND 4035 HAVE K1
FAILING OPEN AT DIFFERENT TIMES WITH CRITS 2/2 AND 2/IR
RESPECTIVELY. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOUR IOA FMEAs
4034, 4035, 4037 AND 4038 INTO ONE FMEA WITH A i/i CRIT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-39
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/99
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4039
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4039
ITEM: RELAY, K2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
UPGRADE IOA FMEA CRIT. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2126-2 HAS BOTH K1 AND
K2 FAIL WITH INADVERTENT OUTPUT. IOA FMEAS 4036 AND 4039 HAVE K1
FAILING CLOSED. RECOMMEND COMBINING BOTH RELAYS ON 4036 WITH THE
FAILURE MODES IN AGREEMENT WITH NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-40
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4040
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4040
ITEM: FUSE, F26
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FAIL MODES AND FMEAS AND UPGRADE CRIT.
05-6IA-2004-I WHILE NOT ACTUALLY SPECIFYING F26)
COVERS TWO FUSES F26 AND F27. THE "LOCATION' TYPO NEEDS
CORRECTING. RECOMMEND COMBINING RMS-4040 AND 4041 IN AGREEMENT
WITH NASA FMEA FAILURE AND CRIT.
THE NASA FMEA
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4041
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4041
ITEM: FUSE, F27
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE IOA FAIL MODES AND FMEAS, CHANGE IOA SCREEN C.
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR STANDBY REDUNDANT
ITEMS. CHANGE IOA SCREEN C TO "i - N/A - P. THE NASA FMEA 05-
6IA-2004-I WHILE NOT ACTUALLY SPECIFYING F26) COVERS TWO FUSES
(F26 AND
COVERS TWO FUSES F26 AND F27. RECOMMEND COMBINING RMS-4040 AND
4041 IN AGREEMENT WITH NASA FMEA FAILURE AND CRIT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-42
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4042
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2176-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RMS/EPD&C
4042
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 27
ROBINSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2176-I COMPONENTS RPC 26, 27, 28 & 29 ARE
ANALYZED FOR FAILURE MODES "FAIL OPEN' AND "SHORTS TO GROUND'
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING IOA FMEAS 4042, 4043, 4047 AND 4049 TO
AGREE WITH NASA CRIT AND SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-43
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4043
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4043
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 26
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2176-I COMPONENTS RPC 26, 27, 28 & 29 ARE
ANALYZED FOR FAILURE MODES "FAIL OPEN' AND "SHORTS TO GROUND'.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING IOA FMEAS 4042, 4043, 4047 AND 4049 TO
AGREE WITH NASA CRIT AND SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-44
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4044
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2178-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4044
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE, IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA/CIL, ADD INADVERTENTLY
OPENS TO THE IOA FMEA AND UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO i/I.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-45
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4045
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2179-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4045
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 31
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ 1 ] [ N/] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS UPGRADING NASA CRIT TO 2/IRAND COMBINING IOA
COMPONENTS ON ONE FMEA. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2179-I FAILS BOTH PORT
AND STARBOARD COMPONENTS. RECOMMEND COMBINING RMS-4045 AND 4046
INTO 4045. UPGRADE NASA FMEA TO CRIT 2/IR.
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION SINCE THE RMS WOULD
NOT BE USED WITHOUT BACKUP POWER AVAILABLE.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 4046.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RMS-4046
05-6IA-2179-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
RMS/EPD&C
4046
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30
ROBINSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ 1 ] [ N/] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS UPGRADING NASA CRIT TO 2/IR AND COMBINING IOA
COMPONENTS ON ONE FMEA. NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2179-I FAILS BOTH PORT
AND STARBOARD COMPONENTS. RECOMMEND COMBINING RMS-4045 AND 4046
INTO 4045. UPGRADE NASA FMEA TO CRIT 2/IR.
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION SINCE THE RMS WOULD
NOT BE USED WITHOUT BACKUP POWER AVAILABLE.
NO ISSUE ON THIS FMEA. REFER TO ISSUE COVERAGE ON IOA FMEA 4045.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-47
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4047
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4047
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 28
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2176-I COMPONENTS RPC 26, 27, 28 & 29 ARE
ANALYZED FOR FAILURE MODES "FAIL OPEN' AND "SHORTS TO GROUND'.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING IOA FMEAS 4042, 4043, 4047 AND 4049 TO
AGREE WITH NASA CRIT AND SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-48
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4048
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4048
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 05-6IA-2176-I COMPONENTS RPC 26, 27, 28 & 29 ARE
ANALYZED FOR FAILURE MODES "FAIL OPEN' AND "SHORTS TO GROUND'.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING IOA FMEAS 4042, 4043, 4047 AND 4049 TO
AGREE WITH NASA CRIT AND SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-49
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4049X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2028-9
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4049
ITEM: SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C I/i ] [ ] C ] C ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA GENERATE A
NEW FMEA WITH THE FAILURE MODE AND CRIT OF NASA POST 51L FMEA 05-
6IA-2028-9.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-50
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4050X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2076-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4050
RESISTOR, A2R2, A2R3, A3R2, A3R3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA GENERATE A
NEW FMEA WITH THE FAILURE MODE AND CRIT OF NASA POST 51L FMEA 05-
6IA-2076-2.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-51
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4051X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4051
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 1 PH 3A RMS, BACKUP POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA GENERATE A
NEW FMEA WITH THE FAILURE MODE AND CRIT OF NASA POST 51L FMEA 05-
6IA-2001-2.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-52
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RMS-4052X
05-6IA-2178-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
RMS/EPD&C
4052
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
ROBINSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA GENERATE A
NEW FMEA WITH THE FAILURE MODE AND CRIT OF NASA POST 51L FMEA 05-
6IA-2178-2.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-53
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4053X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4053
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 26, 27, 28, 29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
GENERATE AN IOA FMEA FOR THESE FAILURE MODES FOR THESE
COMPONENTS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-54
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4054X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4054
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30, RPC 31
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA GENERATE A
NEW FMEA WITH THE FAILURE MODE AND CRIT OF NASA POST 51L FMEA 05-
6IA-2179-2.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-55
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOa [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RMS-4101
EPD&C 05-6-2658-1
RMS/EPD&C
4101
SWITCH, S1
ROBINSON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5827.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-56
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4102
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2658-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4102
ITEM: SWITCH, S1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5828
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-57
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4103
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2658-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4103
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5830.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-58
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4104
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2658-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4104
ITEM: SWITCH, S2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW C ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5829.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4105
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2A
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4105
ITEM: SWITCH, $5
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT AND SCREENS, COMBINE COMPONENTS ON IOA FMEAs
4105 AND 4107. ADD THIS SWITCH TO NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THIS FMEA WITH RMS-4107 AND ADDING THIS
SWITCH. $5, TO THE NASA FMEA 05-6iB-MPM-2A. THIS SWITCH IS PART
OF THE PORT RMS. THE POST 51L NASA FMEAs DO NOT INCLUDE THE PORT
RMS BUT THE BASELINE NASA FMEAs DID INCLUDE THE PORT RMS.
REFER TO IOA FMEA 4107.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-60
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4106
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4106
ITEM: SWITCH, $5
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ I /i ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REFER TO REMARKS ON IOA RMS-4108. COMBINE IOA FMEAs AND ADD THIS
SWITCH TO NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THIS FMEA WITH RMS-4108 AND ADDING THIS
SWITCH. $5, TO THE NASA FMEA 05-6iB-MPM-2B. THIS SWITCH IS PART
OF THE PORT RMS. THE POST 51L NASA FMEAs DO NOT INCLUDE THE PORT
RMS BUT THE BASELINE NASA FMEAs DID INCLUDE THE PORT RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-61
TAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4107
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4107
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST FIL FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 2/IR
AND CHANGE REDUNDANCY SCREENS ACCORDINGLY.
IOA RECOMMENDS NASA ADDING $5 (PORT) TO POST 51L FMEA 05-61B-MPM-
2A. IOA RECOMMENDS IOA COMBINE COMPONENTS ON IOA FMEAs 4105 AND
4107 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME FOR
EITHER SWITCH FAILURE.
LOSS OF OPERATION OF THE STOW/DEPLOY ACTUATOR COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION AND POSSIBLY REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR
ARM IF IT CANNOT BE SAFELY STOWED AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE IF IT CANNOT BE JETTISONED.
REFER TO IOA FMEA 4105.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-62
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:I/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4108A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4108
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE FOR SWITCH 36V73A8A2S2 IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-
2B IS "FAILS CLOSED (ON) " WITH A i/I CRIT ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE
MODE FOR THE SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2D IS "PREMATURE
CLOSE" WITH CRIT i/i ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2E IS "CONTACT TO CONTACT
SHORT" WITH A CRIT I/I ASSIGNED. IOA CONCURS THAT THESE ARE ALL
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE CONSIDERED FOR THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE THE FAILURE MODES ARE ALL FOR THE
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE INCLUDED ON THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE ALL THE FAILURES ARE FOR THE SAME
SWITCH AND THE CRITICALITIES ASSIGNED ARE ALL i/I, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT ALL THESE FOUR FAILURE MODES FOR THIS SWITCH AND FOR ITS
CORRESPONDING SWITCH ON THE PORT ARM BE COMBINED INTO ONE FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING RMS-4106 AND 4108 AND MODIFYING THE FMEA
TO INCLUDE THE FAILURE MODES OF THE FOUR NASA FMEAs.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4108
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2B, D, E, G
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4108
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE FOR SWITCH 36V73A8A2S2 IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-
2B IS "FAILS CLOSED (ON)" WITH A i/i CRIT ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE
MODE FOR THE SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2D IS "PREMATURE
CLOSE" WITH CRIT I/i ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2E IS "CONTACT TO CONTACT
SHORT" WITH A CRIT I/i ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE MODE FOR SWITCH $2
IN NASA FMEA 05-61B-MPM-2G IS "SHORTS POLE TO POLE" WITH A CRIT
i/i ASSIGNED. IOA CONCURS THAT ALL THE FAILURE MODES ARE
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE INCLUDED ON THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE ALL THE FAILURES ARE FOR THE SAME
SWITCH AND THE CRITICALITIES ASSIGNED ARE ALL i/I, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT ALL THESE FOUR FAILURE MODES FOR THIS SWITCH AND FOR ITS
CORRESPONDING SWITCH ON THE PORT ARM BE COMBINED INTO ONE FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING RMS-4106 AND 4108 AND MODIFYING THE FMEA
TO INCLUDE THE FAILURE MODES OF THE FOUR NASA FMEAs.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4108B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2D
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4108
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/PITNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE FOR SWITCH 36V73A8A2S2 IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-
2B IS "FAILS CLOSED (ON)" WITH A 1/1 CRIT ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE
MODE FOR THE SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2D IS "PREMATURE
CLOSE" WITH CRIT i/I ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2E IS "CONTACT TO CONTACT
SHORT" WITH A CRIT 1/1 ASSIGNED. IOA CONCURS THAT THESE ARE ALL
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE CONSIDERED FOR THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE THE FAILURE MODES ARE ALL FOR THE
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE INCLUDED ON THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE ALL THE FAILURES ARE FOR THE SAME
SWITCH AND THE CRITICALITIES ASSIGNED ARE ALL i/I, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT ALL THESE FOUR FAILURE MODES FOR THIS SWITCH AND FOR ITS
CORRESPONDING SWITCH ON THE PORT ARM BE COMBINED INTO ONE FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING RMS-4106 AND 4108 AND MODIFYING THE FMEA
TO INCLUDE THE FAILURE MODES OF THE FOUR NASA FMEAs.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4108C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2E
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4108
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE FOR SWITCH 36V73A8A2S2 IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-
2B IS "FAILS CLOSED (ON)" WITH A i/I CRIT ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE
MODE FOR THE SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2D IS "PREMATURE
CLOSE" WITH CRIT i/i ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2E IS "CONTACT TO CONTACT
SHORT" WITH A CRIT I/I ASSIGNED. IOA CONCURS THAT THESE ARE ALL
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE CONSIDERED FOR THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE THE FAILURE MODES ARE ALL FOR THE
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE INCLUDED ON THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE ALL THE FAILURES ARE FOR THE SAME
SWITCH AND THE CRITICALITIES ASSIGNED ARE ALL i/I, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT ALL THESE FOUR FAILURE MODES FOR THIS SWITCH AND FOR ITS
CORRESPONDING SWITCH ON THE PORT ARM BE COMBINED INTO ONE FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING RMS-4106 AND 4108 AND MODIFYING THE FMEA
TO INCLUDE THE FAILURE MODES OF THE FOUR NASA FMEAs.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4108D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2G
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4108
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE FAILURE MODE FOR SWITCH 36V73A8A2S2 IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-
2B IS "FAILS CLOSED (ON) " WITH A i/I CRIT ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE
MODE FOR THE SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2D IS "PREMATURE
CLOSE" WITH CRIT I/i ASSIGNED. THE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
SAME SWITCH IN NASA FMEA 05-6IB-MPM-2E IS "CONTACT TO CONTACT
SHORT" WITH A CRIT I/i ASSIGNED. IOA CONCURS THAT THESE ARE ALL
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE CONSIDERED FOR THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE THE FAILURE MODES ARE ALL FOR THE
CREDIBLE FAILURES AND RECOMMENDS THAT THEY BE INCLUDED ON THE
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST. SINCE ALL THE FAILURES ARE FOR THE SAME
SWITCH AND THE CRITICALITIES ASSIGNED ARE ALL I/I, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT ALL THESE FOUR FAILURE MODES FOR THIS SWITCH AND FOR ITS
CORRESPONDING SWITCH ON THE PORT ARM BE COMBINED INTO ONE FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING RMS-4106 AND 4108 AND MODIFYING THE FMEA
TO INCLUDE THE FAILURE MODES OF THE FOUR NASA FMEAs.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4109
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4109
ITEM: FUSE, F6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C /N ] C N ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA
CRIT TO 3/IR. RECOMMEND COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON IOA FMEAs
4109, 4110, 4111, AND 4112 FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-68
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4110
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4110
ITEM: FUSE, F5
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA
CRIT TO 3/IR. RECOMMEND COMBINING THE IOA FMEAs 4109, 4110,
4111, AND 4112 FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4111
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4111
ITEM: FUSE, FII
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA
CRIT TO 3/IR. RECOMMEND COMBINING THE IOA FMEAs 4109, 4110,
4111, AND 4112 FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4112
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4112
ITEM: FUSE, FI0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
[P] [P] [
[P] [P] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA
CRIT TO 3/IR. RECOMMEND COMBINING THE IOA FMEAs 4109, 4110,
4111, AND 4112 FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-71
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4113
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4113
HYBRID RELAY, K72
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IRAND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4114
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4114
HYBRID RELAY, K72
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ X ] *
IOA [i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH (2) IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE
SAME ONE (i) NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (i) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4115
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4115
HYBRID RELAY, K49
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4116
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4116
HYBRID RELAY, K49
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE SAME
ONE NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (i) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4117
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4117
HYBRID RELAY, K60
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4118
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4118
HYBRID RELAY, K60
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] C ] C ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE SAME
ONE NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (i) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4119
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4119
HYBRID RELAY, K51
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IRAND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4120
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4120
HYBRID RELAY, K51
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSESTHE BOTH IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE SAME
ONE NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (i) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4121
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4121
HYBRID RELAY, K22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4122
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4122
HYBRID RELAY, K22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE SAME
ONE NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (I) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4123
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4123
HYBRID RELAY, K62
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4124
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4124
HYBRID RELAY, K62
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE SAME
ONE NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (I) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4125
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4125
HYBRID RELAY, K24
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4126
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4126
HYBRID RELAY, K24
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE) •
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE SAME
ONE NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (i) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4127
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4127
HYBRID RELAY, K50
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND COMBINE IOA FMEAs TO INCLUDE LIKE
CORRESPONDING COMPONENTS FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L CRIT 3/IR. THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT
SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DID NOT DUPLICATE FMEAs FOR
BOTH THE PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA FMEA.
FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD IOA FMEAs
WERE COMPARED TO THE EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA SINCE THE EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME WHETHER IT BE A PORT OR A STARBOARD FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4128
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4128
HYBRID RELAY, K50
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT. THE NASA POST 51L
FMEAs DO NOT SPECIFY REFERENCE DESIGNATORS AND DO NOT DUPLICATE
FMEAs FOR PORT AND STARBOARD SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, SINCE IOA DOES,
IOA HAS TWO FMEAs THAT CORRESPOND TO ONE NASA POST 51L FMEA. FOR
ASSESSMENT PURPOSES THE BOTH IOA FMEAs WERE COMPARED TO THE SAME
ONE NASA FMEA.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS ON THE FOLLOWING IOA
FMEAs INTO ONE (i) FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES: 4114, 4116,
4118, 4120, 4122, 4124, 4126 AND 4128.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4129
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4129
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR9, 11
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs INTO ONE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4130
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4130
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR9, ii
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4131
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4131
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI3, 15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4132
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4132
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI3, 15
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4133
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4133
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR8, I0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4134
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4134
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR8, i0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4135
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4135
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4136
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4136
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 14
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4137
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4137
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI4, 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4138
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4138
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI4, 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEAANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4139
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4139
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR6, 8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4140
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4140
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR6, 8
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4141
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4141
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 16
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4142
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4142
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 16
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-101
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4143
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4143
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR2, 4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEAANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4144
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4144
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR2, 4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. ONE POST 51L NASA FMEA ANALYZED THE FAILURE MODE
RELATIVE TO FAILURE OF THE TOTAL INDICATION CIRCUIT SUCH THAT IT
PROVIDED ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FMEAs ANALYZED THE FAILURE
MODE RELATIVE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS IN THE CIRCUIT.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITIES INVOLVED ARE ALL 3/3, THE
FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
INDIVIDUAL IOA FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-103
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4145
NASA FME #: EPD&C 05-6-2616-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4145
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5968.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-104
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4146
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2616-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4146
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5969.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-i05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4147
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2615-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4147
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6148.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4148
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2615-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4148
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6149.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4149
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2615-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4149
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6330.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4150
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2615-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4150
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6331.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-109
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4151
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2614-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMSIEPD&C
4151
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5970.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4152
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2614-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4152
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5971.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-ill
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RMS-4153
EPD&C 05-6-2613-1
RMS/EPD&C
4153
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB9
ROBINSON
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEAAND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6152.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-112
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4154
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2613-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4154
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6153.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4155
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2613-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4155
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6332.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-114
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4156
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2613-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4156
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-6333.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4157
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4157
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5083.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4158
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2656-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4158
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEAAND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5084.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-117
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4159
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4159
ITEM: SWITCH, $3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5115.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE EPD&C PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER
SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE ANALYZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS
OF THE FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-118
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4160
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2654-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4160
ITEM: SWITCH, $3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5116.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-I19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4161
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4161
ITEM: SWITCH, $7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5224.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4162
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2655-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4162
ITEM: SWITCH, $7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5225.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4163
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4163
ITEM: SWITCH, $9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEAAND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5230.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4164
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2655-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4164
ITEM: SWITCH, $9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5231.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4165
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4165
ITEM: SWITCH, S12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5432.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4166
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4166
ITEM: SWITCH, S12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: _If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5433.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4167
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4167
ITEM: SWITCH, S13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEAAND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5434.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4168
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4168
ITEM: SWITCH, S13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5435.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4169
NASA FME #: EPD&C 05-6-2706-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4169
ITEM: RESISTOR, R2
LEAD ANALYST : ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5082.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4170
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2704-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4170
ITEM: RESISTOR, R3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEAAND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5114.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4171
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2705-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4171
ITEM: RESISTOR, R7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5223.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4172
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2703-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4172
ITEM: RESISTOR, R9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEA AND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5229.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-131
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4173
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2705-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4173
RESISTOR, RI2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEAAND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5439.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4174
NASA FMEA #: EPD&C 05-6-2703-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4174
RESISTOR, RI3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISREGARD THIS IOA FMEAAND REFER TO IOA FMEA EPD&C-5431.
THIS COMPONENT IS PART OF THE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SYSTEM
AND SHOULD BE ANALIZED WITH REGARDS TO THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE AND NOT LIMITED TO ITS EFFECTS ON RMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-133
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4175X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2C
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4175
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA DOES NOT REQUIRE ASSESSMENT DUE TO ITS CRIT. THIS IOA
FMEA WAS GENERATED TO ESTABLISH A FAILURE MODE WHICH WAS NOT
COVERED BY IOA IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA EXCEPT THAT THE
REDUNDANCY SCREENS SHOULD BE BLANK FOR CRIT 3/3 FMEAs.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-134
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4176X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-2F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4176
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L NASA FMEA. THIS IOA FMEA WAS
GENERATED TO ESTABLISH A FAILURE MODE WHICH WAS NOT COVERED BY
IOA IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
LOSS OF OPERATION OF THE STOW/DEPLOY ACTUATOR COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION AND POSSIBLY REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR
ARM IF IT CANNOT BE SAFELY STOWED AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE IF IT CANNOT BE SAFELY JETTISONED.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4177X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-SA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4177
RESISTORS, 2W, (6 EACH)
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA EXCEPT THAT THE
REDUNDANCY SCREENS SHOULD BE BLANK. THIS IOA ADDITIONAL FMEA IS
GENERATED FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-136
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4178X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4178
RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W,
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
( 2 EACH)
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. THIS IOA
ADDITIONAL FMEA IS GENERATED FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-137
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4179X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4179
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. THIS IOA
ADDITIONAL FMEA IS GENERATED FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-138
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4180X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4180
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. THIS IOA
ADDITIONAL FMEA IS GENERATED FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-139
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4181X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-8
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4181
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. THIS IOA
ADDITIONAL FMEA IS GENERATED FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-140
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4182X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-SA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4182
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. THIS IOA
ADDITIONAL FMEA IS GENERATED FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4183X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IB-MPM-II
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4183
ITEM: RESISTORS,
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
(16 EACH)
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF POSITION INDICATIONS.
IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE CRITICALITY INVOLVED IS 3/3, IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR ASSESSMENT
SIMPLIFICATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4201
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4201
HYBRID RELAY, K20
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4202
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4202
HYBRID RELAY, K20
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4202, 4204, 4236, 4238,
4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304, 4324, AND 4326.
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4203
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4203
HYBRID RELAY, K52
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a S C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4204
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4204
HYBRID RELAY, K52
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4202, 4204, 4236, 4238,
4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304, 4324, AND 4326.
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4205
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4205
HYBRID RELAY, K8
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4206
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4206
HYBRID RELAY, K8
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT".
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IAO SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242,
4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306, 4308, 4328, AND 4330.
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4207
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4207
HYBRID RELAY, K64
LEAD ANALYST : ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-149
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4208
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4208
HYBRID RELAY, K64
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FEMAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA FMEAs
ARE FOR 6 PORT AND 6 STBD HYBRID RELAYS.
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4209
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2128-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4209
ITEM: RELAY, K44
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA FMEA TO CRITICALITY 2/IR.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6IC
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4210
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2131-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4210
ITEM: RELAY, K76
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/2R] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
RECOMMEND UPGRADING THE NASA FMEA TO 3/2R. RECOMMEND COMBINING
COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4210 AND 4288.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6I
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4211
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4211
ITEM: FUSE, F4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4212
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4212
ITEM: FUSE, F6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS° SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4213
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4213
RESISTOR, R27
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ]. [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4214
NASA FMEA #: 05_6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4214
RESISTOR, R67
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IN] IN]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ]. [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4215
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4215
RESISTOR, R28
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4216
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4216
RESISTOR, R63
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4217
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4217
ITEM: RESISTOR, R2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-159
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4218
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD_C
4218
RESISTOR, RI4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-160
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4219
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4219
RESISTOR, R25
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-161
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4220
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4220
RESISTOR, R32
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT . HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4221
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4221
RESISTOR, R26
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-163
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4222
NASA FME #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4222
ITEM: RESISTOR, R33
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4223
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4223
HYBRID DRIVER, AR4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-165
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4224
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4224
HYBRID DRIVER, AR4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ ]
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE 1, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-166
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4225
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4225
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4226
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-I1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4226
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4227
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMS/EPD&C
4227
HYBRID DRIVER, AR5
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4228
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
RMS/EPD&C
4228
HYBRID DRIVER, AR5
ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4229
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4229
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-171
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4230
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4230
HYBRID DRIVER, ARI3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE 1, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4231
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4231
ITEM: FUSE, AR4FI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-173
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4232
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4232
ITEM: FUSE, ARIOFI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4233
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4233
ITEM: FUSE, AR5FI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4234
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4234
ITEM: FUSE, ARI3FI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4235
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4235
HYBRID RELAY, K55
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4236
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4236
HYBRID RELAY, K55
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4202, 4204, 4236, 4238,
4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304, 4324, AND 4326.
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4237
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4237
HYBRID RELAY, K69
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4238
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4238
HYBRID RELAY, K69
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4239
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4239
HYBRID RELAY, K43
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C /N ] C N ] [ N ] C N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4240
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
RMS/EPD&C
4240
HYBRID RELAY, K43
ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA FMEAs:
4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306, 4308,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4241
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4241
HYBRID RELAY, K57
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE l-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4242
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4242
HYBRID RELAY, K57
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4243
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2127-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4243
ITEM: RELAY, K57
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
IN] IN] IN] CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA FMEA TO CRITICALITY 2/IR.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6IC
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4244
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2130-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4244
ITEM: RELAY, KS0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[P] [ ]*
[P] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND UPGRADING THE NASA FMEA TO 3/2R. RECOMMEND COMBINING
COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4244 AND 4310.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6I
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4245
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4245
ITEM: FUSE, F2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4246
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4246
ITEM: FUSE, F4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4247
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4247
RESISTOR, R29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ N ] [ N ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4248
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4248
RESISTOR, R65
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ N ] C N ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4249
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4249
RESISTOR, R28
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ N ] [ N ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4250
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4250
RESISTOR, R61
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE) •
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4251
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4251
ITEM: RESISTOR, R1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 1 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4252
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4252
RESISTOR, RII
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4253
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4253
RESISTOR, R25
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4254
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4254
ITEM: RESISTOR, RI4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4255
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4255
RESISTOR, R26
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4256
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4256
RESISTOR, RI5
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4257
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4257
HYBRID RELAY, K75
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUN C A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[P] [ ]*
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4258
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4258
HYBRID RELAY, K75
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4259
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4259
HYBRID RELAY, K78
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4260
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4260
HYBRID RELAY, K78
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4261
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4261
HYBRID RELAY, K73
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[P] [ ]*
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4262
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4262
HYBRID RELAY, K73
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4263
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4263
HYBRID RELAY, K76
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4264
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4264
HYBRID RELAY, K76
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4265
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4265
ITEM: RELAY, K77
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA FMEA TO CRITICALITY 2/IR.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6IC
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-207
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4266
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2129-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4266
ITEM: RELAY, KII
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
N_ C ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/2R] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND UPGRADING THE NASA FMEA TO 3/2R. RECOMMEND COMBINING
COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4266 AND 4332.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6IC
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-208
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4267
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4267
ITEM: FUSE, F8
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4268
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4268
ITEM: FUSE, F2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-210
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4269
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4269
RESISTOR, R61
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4270
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4270
RESISTOR, R41
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4271
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4271
RESISTOR, R62
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4272
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4272
RESISTOR, R40
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4273
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4273
RESISTOR, RI4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
RMS-4274 BASELINE [ ]
05-6IC-MRL-7 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4274
ITEM: RESISTOR, R2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ /N ]
ROBINSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4275
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4275
RESISTOR, R59
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM i FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4276
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4276
RESISTOR, R31
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4277
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4277
RESISTOR, R60
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4278
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4278
ITEM: RESISTOR, R33
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4279
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4279
HYBRID RELAY, K54
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4280
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4280
HYBRID RELAY, K54
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4281
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4281
HYBRID RELAY, K56
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4282
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4282
HYBRID RELAY, K56
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4283
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4283
HYBRID RELAY, K66
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4284
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4284
HYBRID RELAY, K66
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4285
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4285
HYBRID RELAY, K44
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4286
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4286
HYBRID RELAY, K44
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4287
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2128-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4287
ITEM: RELAY, K68
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA FMEA TO CRITICALITY 2/IR.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6IC
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4288
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2131-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4288
ITEM: RELAY, K58
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND UPGRADING THE NASA FMEA TO 3/2R. RECOMMEND COMBINING
COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4210 AND 4288.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6IC
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4289
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4289
ITEM: FUSE, F7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ 1
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4290
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4290
ITEM: FUSE, F3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-232
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4291
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4291
RESISTOR, R68
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-233
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4292
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4292
RESISTOR, R34
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ N ] [ N ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-234
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4293
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4293
RESISTOR, R64
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-235
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4294
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4294
ITEM: RESISTOR, R33
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ N ] [ N ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-236
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4295
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4295
RESISTOR, RI2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-237
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4296
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4296
ITEM: RESISTOR, R2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IRAND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-238
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4297
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4297
RESISTOR, R35
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-239
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4298
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4298
RESISTOR, R31
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-240
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4299
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4299
RESISTOR, R34
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
F LI GHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-241
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4300
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4300
RESISTOR, R30
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-242
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4301
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4301
HYBRID RELAY, K59
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4302
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4302
HYBRID RELAY, K59
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4303
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4303
HYBRID RELAY, K76
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4304
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4304
HYBRID RELAY, K76
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4305
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4305
HYBRID RELAY, K71
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-247
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4306
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4306
HYBRID RELAY, K71
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-248
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4307
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4307
HYBRID RELAY, K74
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4308
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4308
HYBRID RELAY, K74
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-250
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4309
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4309
ITEM: RELAY, K78
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA FMEA TO CRITICALITY 2/IR.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6I
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4310
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4310
ITEM: RELAY, K78
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/2R] [ ] [ ] [p] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND UPGRADING THE NASA FMEA TO 3/2R. RECOMMEND COMBINING
COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4244 AND 4310.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6I
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-252
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4311
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4311
ITEM: FUSE, F5,
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4312
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4312
ITEM: FUSE, F9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4313
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4313
RESISTOR, R66
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-255
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4314
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
RMS/EPD&C
4314
RESISTOR, R66
ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-256
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4315
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4315
RESISTOR, R62
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-257
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4316
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4316
RESISTOR, R67
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-258
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4317
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4317
RESISTOR, RI0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-259
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4318
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4318
ITEM: RESISTOR, R2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-260
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4319
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4319
ITEM: RESISTOR, R16
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-261
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4320
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4320
RESISTOR, R64
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-262
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4321
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4321
RESISTOR, RI7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-263
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4322
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4322
RESISTOR, R65
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-264
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4323
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4323
HYBRID RELAY, K24
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-265
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4324
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4324
HYBRID RELAY, K24
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-266
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4325
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4325
HYBRID RELAY, K27
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-267
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4326
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4326
HYBRID RELAY, K27
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs TO
COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs:
4202, 4204, 4236, 4238, 4258, 4260, 4280, 4282, 4302, 4304,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR LATCHING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-268
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4327
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4327
HYBRID RELAY, KI2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-269
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4328
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4328
HYBRID RELAY, KI2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-270
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4329
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4329
HYBRID RELAY, K29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE I-P-P. TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA, IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE FOLLOWING 24 IOA FMEAs: 4201, 4203, 4205, 4207,
4235, 4237, 4239, 4241, 4257, 4259, 4261, 4263, 4279, 4281, 4283,
4285, 4301, 4303, 4305, 4307, 4323, 4325, 4327, AND 4329. THE
IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 12 PORT AND 12 STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS USED BY
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2, FWD, MID, AND AFT LATCH/RELEASE FOR BOTH
PORT AND STARBOARD ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-271
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4330
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4330
HYBRID RELAY, K29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE POST 51L CRIT OF 3/IR. IOA SCREENS SHOULD
BE 1 - P - P. IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAS
TO COMPARE WITH THE NASA FMEA. COMBINE THE FOLLOWING 6 IOA
FMEAs: 4206, 4208, 4240, 4242, 4262, 4264, 4284, 4286, 4306,
THE 12 IOA FMEAs ARE FOR 6 INDIVIDUAL PORT AND 6 INDIVIDUAL
STARBOARD HYBRID RELAYS FOR RELEASING.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-272
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4331
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4331
ITEM: RELAY, K23
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA FMEA TO CRITICALITY 2/IR.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6I
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-273
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4332
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2129-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
N_ [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4332
ITEM: RELAY, KI7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/2R] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND UPGRADING THE NASA FMEA TO 3/2R. RECOMMEND COMBINING
COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4266 AND 4332.
THE IOA FMEA FOR FAILURE OF THESE RELAYS WAS GENERATED AS PART OF
THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH CONTROL CIRCUIT WHICH IS 05-6I
SET OF NASA FMEAS ALSO AND THEREFORE THE RESULT OF THE FAILURES
DO NOT MATCH WHEN COMPARED. THE RELAYS ARE 4 POLE, 2
POSITION LATCHING RELAYS AND APPEAR IN BOTH THE LATCH CONTROL AND
THE JETTISON/GUILLOTINE CIRCUITS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-274
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4333
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4333
FUSE, 2 AMP, F3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-275
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4334
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4334
FUSE, 2 AMP, F3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT
MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO
INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA
CORRESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs: 4211, 4212, 4245, 4246,
4267, 4268, 4289, 4290, 4311, 4312, 4333, AND 4334. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE
TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-276
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4335
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4335
ITEM: RESISTOR, R49
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-277
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4336
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4336
RESISTOR, R22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4335 THRU 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-278
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4337
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4337
ITEM: RESISTOR, R42
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4337 AND 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-279
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4338
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4338
RESISTOR, R23
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS THE "READY TO LATCH INDICATION
CIRCUIT" WITH THE FAILURE MODE AS "ERRONEOUS INDICATION". THE
IOA FMEAs ADDRESS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. FOR COMPARISON
PURPOSES, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4213 THRU 4216, 4247 THRU 4750, 4269 THRU 4272, 4291 THRU 4294,
4313 THRU 4316, AND 4337 AND 4338.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-280
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4339
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4339
ITEM: RESISTOR, R2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-281
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/30/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4340
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-7
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4340
ITEM: RESISTOR, R3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ ./ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND CORRECT
IOA SCREENS. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE FAILURES COULD CAUSE MOTOR
BURNOUT AND COULD LEAD TO INABILITY TO SAFELY LATCH THE RMS AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GUILLOTINE/JETTISON SYSTEM WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS ONE NASA FMEA CORRESPONDS
TO THE FOLLOWING 12 IOA FMEAs: 4217, 4218, 4251, 4252, 4273,
4274, 4295, 4296, 4317, 4318, 4339 AND 4340. IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING ALL LISTED IOA FMEAs INTO ONE TO ALLOW COMPARISON WITH
NASA POST 51L FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-282
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4341
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4341
RESISTOR, R34
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-283
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4342
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4342
ITEM: RESISTOR, R33
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-284
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4343
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4343
RESISTOR, R36
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE i, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4344
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-II
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4344
RESISTOR, R31
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. THE NASA FMEA ITEM IS "INDICATION CIRCUIT - HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I, RESISTORS & EVENT INDIICATION", AND INCLUDES
SYSTEM 1 FWD/MID/AFT PEDESTAL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. FOR
COMPARISON, IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE FOLLOWING IOA FMEAs:
4219 THRU 4234, 4253 THRU 4256, 4275 THRU 4278, 4297 THRU 4300,
4319 THRU 4322 AND 4341 THRU 4344. FMEAs WITH 3/3 CRIT DO NOT
REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-286
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4345X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4345
ITEM: FUSE, F3, F4
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THESE COMPONENTS WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4346X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-2A
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4346
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 05-6IC-MRL-2A, 2E, AND 2F.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4347X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-2B
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4347
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 05-6IC-MRL-2B, -2D, AND -2G.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4348X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-2C
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4348
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4349X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-2D
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4349
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 05-6IC-MRL-2B, -2D, AND -2G.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4350X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-2E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4350
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 05-6IC-MRL-2A, 2E, AND 2F.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4351X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-2F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4351
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 05-6IC-MRL-2A, 2E, AND 2F.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4352X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-2G
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4352
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA POST 51L FMEA. IOA
RECOMMENDS GENERATING A COMPARABLE FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 05-6IC-MRL-2B, -2D, AND -2G.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-294
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4353X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4353
LIMIT SWITCH - LATCHED & RELEASED
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA
GENERATE A CORRESPONDING FMEA TO ALLOW ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4354X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4354
LIMIT SWITCH - RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / J 1 r
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA
GENERATE A CORRESPONDING FMEA TO ALLOW ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/24/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4355X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6IC-MRL-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4355
LIMIT SWITCH - LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. RECOMMEND IOA
GENERATE A CORRESPONDING FMEA TO ALLOW ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4501
ITEM: SWITCH, $21
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4502
ITEM: SWITCH, $21
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE SWITCH IS NOT NORMALLY ENERGIZED UNLESS IT IS READY TO BE
USED. CIRCUIT BREAKERS AHEAD OF THE SWITCH IN THE CIRCUIT ARE
NOT CLOSED WHEN THE RMS IS NOT IN USE, THEREFORE, IOA CONCURS
THAT A FAILED CLOSED CONDITION FOR THIS SWITCH WOULD NOW WARRANT
A 2/IR CRIT AND RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2031-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4503
ITEM: SWITCH, S28
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2031-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4504
ITEM: SWITCH, $28
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE SWITCH IS NOT NORMALLY ENERGIZED UNLESS IT IS READY TO BE
USED. CIRCUIT BREAKERS AHEAD OF THE SWITCH IN THE CIRCUIT ARE
NOT CLOSED WHEN THE RMS IS NOT IN USE, THEREFORE, IOA CONCURS
THAT A FAILED CLOSED CONDITION FOR THIS SWITCH WOULD NOW WARRANT
A 2/IR CRIT AND RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2032-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4505
ITEM: SWITCH, $25
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] .
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2032-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4506
ITEM: SWITCH, $25
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_mC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ]
B
[P]
[P]
[ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
THE SWITCH IS NOT NORMALLY ENERGIZED UNLESS IT IS READY TO BE
USED. CIRCUIT BREAKERS AHEAD OF THE SWITCH IN THE CIRCUIT ARE
NOT CLOSED WHEN THE RMS IS NOT IN USE, THEREFORE, IOA CONCURS
THAT A FAILED CLOSED CONDITION FOR THIS SWITCH WOULD NOW WARRANT
A 2/IR CRIT AND RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2027-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4507
ITEM: SWITCH, $32
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2027-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4508
ITEM: SWITCH, $32
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
IN]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND CHANGING IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO FAIL.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2033-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4509
ITEM: SWITCH, $24
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4510
ITEM: SWITCH, $24
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND DOWNGRADING IOA CRIT FROM 2/IR TO 3/IR.
THE SWITCH IS NOT NORMALLY ENERGIZED UNLESS IT IS READY TO BE
USED. CIRCUIT BREAKERS AHEAD OF THE SWITCH IN THE CIRCUIT ARE
NOT CLOSED WHEN THE RMS IS NOT IN USE, THEREFORE, IOA CONCURS
THAT A FAILED CLOSED CONDITION FOR THIS SWITCH WOULD NOW WARRANT
A 2/IR CRIT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2028-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4511
ITEM: SWITCH, $31
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2028-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4512
ITEM: SWITCH, $31
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
IN]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND CHANGING IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO FAIL.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2034-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4513
ITEM: SWITCH, $23
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B C
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If. different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2034-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4514
ITEM: SWITCH, S23
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ]
B
[P]
[P]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
THE SWITCH IS NOT NORMALLY ENERGIZED UNLESS IT IS READY TO BE
USED. CIRCUIT BREAKERS AHEAD OF THE SWITCH IN THE CIRCUIT ARE
NOT CLOSED WHEN THE RMS IS NOT IN USE, THEREFORE, IOA CONCURS
THAT A FAILED CLOSED CONDITION FOR THIS SWITCH WOULD NOW WARRANT
A 2/IR CRIT AND RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-311
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4515
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2029-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4515
ITEM: SWITCH, $30
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4516
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2029-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4516
ITEM: SWITCH, $30
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
[N]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND CHANGING IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO FAIL.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4517
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2035-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4517
ITEM: SWITCH, $22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4518
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4518
ITEM: SWITCH, $22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
THE SWITCH IS NOT NORMALLY ENERGIZED UNLESS IT IS READY TO BE
USED. CIRCUIT BREAKERS AHEAD OF THE SWITCH IN THE CIRCUIT ARE
NOT CLOSED WHEN THE RMS IS NOT IN USE, THEREFORE, IOA CONCURS
THAT A FAILED CLOSED CONDITION FOR THIS SWITCH WOULD NOW WARRANT
A 2/IR CRIT AND RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE IOA CRIT TO 3/IR.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4519
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2030-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4519
ITEM: SWITCH, $29
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] [x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ], [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/8'8
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4520
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2030-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4520
ITEM: SWITCH, $29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[F]
[P]
[N]
C
CP]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4521
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2026-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4521
ITEM: SWITCH, $33
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS,
RECOMMEND UPGRADING IOA CRITICALITY AND ADDING TO CIL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4522
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2026-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4522
ITEM: SWITCH, $33
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B
[ NA]
[P]
[N]
C
[ NA]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ].
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4523
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4523
ITEM: FUSE, F27
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA FMEA HAS TYPO IN "ITEM". SHOULD BE "F37" NOT "F27".
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4524
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4524
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB27
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4524 AND 4528 TO AGREE WITH BASE
COMPONENTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4525
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2003-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4525
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB27
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ N ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4525 AND 4529 TO AGREE WITH NASA
BASE COMPONENTS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2002-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4526
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
IOA RECOMMENDS UPGRADING THE IOA FMEA CRITICALITY AND ADDING THIS
FAILURE MODE FOR THIS COMPONENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4527
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4527
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB29
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4527 AND 4531 TO AGREE WITH NASA
BASE COMPONENTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4528
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4528
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB33
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4524 AND 4528 TO AGREE WITH BASE
COMPONENTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4529
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2003-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4529
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB33
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4525 AND 4529 TO AGREE WITH NASA
BASE COMPONENTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4530
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2002A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4530
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB32
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAS 4526 AND 4530 TO AGREE WITH BASE
COMPONENTS.
CORRECT IOA SCREEN B.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS/EPD&C
4531
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB32
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
COMBINE COMPONENTS IN IOA FMEAs 4527 AND 4531 TO AGREE WITH NASA
BASE COMPONENTS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2507-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4532
ITEM: PIC 1
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[F]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4533
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2515-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4533
ITEM: PIC 1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4534
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2507-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4534
ITEM: PIC 12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[F]
[P]
[N]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4535
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2515-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4535
ITEM: PIC 12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2507-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4536
ITEM: PIC i, 12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4560 AND
4561.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4537
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2515-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4537
ITEM: PIC I, 12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE IN/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4536 AND
4537.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2505-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4538
ITEM: PIC 6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-335
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4539
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2513-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4539
ITEM: PIC 6
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-336
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4540
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2505-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4540
ITEM: PIC 17
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
IF]
[P]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-337
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4541
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2513-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4541
ITEM: PIC 17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-338
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2505-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
ITEM: PIC 6, 17
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
I", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4542 AND
4543.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-339
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2513-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4543
ITEM: PIC 6, 17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM" "FIRE
I", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4542 AND
4543.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-340
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4544
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2503-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4544
ITEM: PIC 8
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[F]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-341
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2511-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4545
ITEM: PIC 8
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-342
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4546
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2503-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4546
ITEM: PIC 19
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-343
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4547
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2511-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4547
ITEM: PIC 19
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-344
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4548
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2503-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4548
ITEM: PIC 8, 19
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4548 AND
4549.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-345
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4549
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2511-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4549
ITEM: PIC 8, 19
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4548 AND
4549.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-346
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4550
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4550
ITEM: PIC I0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-347
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4551
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2509-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4551
ITEM: PIC I0
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88
c-348 C .jr
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4552
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4552
ITEM: PIC 21
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-349
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4553
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2509-1
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4553
ITEM: PIC 21
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-350
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4554
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2501-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4554
ITEM: PIC I0, 21
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4554 AND
4555.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-351
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2509-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4555
ITEM: PIC i0, 21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
I", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4554 AND
4555.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-352
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4556
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2506-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4556
ITEM: PIC 2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
IN]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-353
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4557
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2514-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4557
ITEM: PIC 2
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-354
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4558
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2506-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4558
ITEM: PIC 13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-355
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4559
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2514-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4559
ITEM: PIC 13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-356
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4560
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2506-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4560
ITEM: PIC 2, 13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4536 AND
4537.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-357
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4561
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2514-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4561
ITEM: PIC 2, 13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4560 AND
4561.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-358
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4562
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2504-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4562
ITEM: PIC 7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-359
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4563
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2512-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4563
ITEM: PIC 7
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-360
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4564
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2504-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4564
ITEM: PIC 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C
[P] [F] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] IN] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If .different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-361
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4565
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2512-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4565
ITEM: PIC 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-362
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4566
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2504-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4566
ITEM: PIC 7, 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4566 AND
4567.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-363
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4567
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2512-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4567
ITEM: PIC 7, 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4566 AND
4567.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-364
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4568
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2502-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4568
ITEM: PIC 9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
IN]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-365
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4569
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2510-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4569
ITEM: PIC 9
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-366
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4570
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4570
ITEM: PIC 20
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-367
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4571
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2510-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4571
ITEM: PIC 20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-368
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4572
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2502-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4572
ITEM: PIC 9, 20
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4572 AND
4573.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-369
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4573
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2510-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4573
ITEM: PIC 9, 20
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4572 AND
4573.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-370
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4574
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2500-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4574
ITEM: PIC ii
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO 'IF".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-371
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4575
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2508-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4575
ITEM: PIC ii
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-372
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4576
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2500-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4576
ITEM: PIC 22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[F]
[P]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS. FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-373
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4577
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2508-I
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4577
ITEM: PIC 22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B. RECOMMEND CHANGE IOA
AND NASA BASELINE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO "F".
RECOMMEND COMBINING IOA FMEAs TO AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-374
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4578
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2500-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4578
ITEM: PIC ii, 22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM", "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4578 AND
4579.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-375
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4579
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2508-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4579
ITEM: PIC ii, 22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE
IOA CRIT TO 3/IR AND DELETING THIS FMEA FROM THE IOA CIL LIST.
NOMINALLY FOR A PIC TO ARM AND FIRE PREMATURELY, AN "ARM" "FIRE
i", AND A "FIRE 2" ARE REQUIRED.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE COMPONENTS OF IOA FMEAs 4578 AND
4579.
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 C-376
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D EPD&C/RMS 05-61A
NASA FNEA IOA ID ITEM NAME FAILURE MODE
05-61A-2028-1X 4001 SNITCH, $4 FAILS TO SNITCH FROM OFF.
05-6IA-2028-5 4002 SNITCH, $4 SHORTS TO GND WHILE IN USE.
05-61A-2028-1X 4003 SNITCH, $4 FALLS TO SNITCH PR% PNR ON.
05-6IA-2028-1X 4004 SNITCH, $4 FALLS TO SNITCH BACKUP ON.
05-61A-2028-2X 4005 SNITCH, $4 PR! PNR FALLS OPEN IN USE.
05-61A-2028-6 4006 SNITCH, $4 FALLS CLOSED IN PRIMARY POS.
05-61A-2029-5 4007 SWITCH, $1 FALLS TO SNITCH FROM OFF.
05-61A-2029-5 4008 SNITCH, $I SNORTS TO GND WHILE IN USE.
05-61A-2029-5 4009 SNITCH, S1 FAILS OPEN NHILE ARM IN USE.
05-61A-2026-1 4010 SNITCH, $8 FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IN USE.
05-61A-2026-1 4011 SWITCH, S10 FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IN USE.
05-61A-2026-2 4012 $8, $10 FALLS TO SNITCH FROM OFF.
05-61A-2026-1 4013 SNITCH, $7 FALLS OFF WHILE ARM 1N USE.
05-61A-2026-1 4014 SNITCH, S9 FALLS TO SNITCH OFF.
05-6[A-2026-2 4015 $7, $9 FAILS TO SNITCH OFF.
05-61A-2003-1 4016 FUSE, F1 FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOY.
05-6IA-2003-1 4017 FUSE, F1 FAILS OPEN WHILE IN USE.
05-6IA-2002-1 4018 FUSE, F2 FALLS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOY.
05-61A-2002-1 4019 FUSE, F2 FALLS OPEN WHILE IN USE.
05-61A-2076-1 4020 RES, A3R2 FALLS OPEN.
05"61A'2076-1 4021 RES, A3R3 FAILS OPEN.
05-61A-2076-1 4022 RES, A2R2 FAILS OPEN.
05-61A-2076-1 4023 RES, A2R3 FAILS OPEN.
05-6[A-2006-1 4028 CB17 FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOY.
05-6IA-2006-1 4029 CB17 FALLS OPEN NHILE IN USE.
05-6[A-2001-1 4031 CB19 FALLS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOY.
05-6IA-2001-1 4032 CB19 FALLS OPEN WHILE IN USE.
05-61A-2126-1 4034 RELAY, K1 FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOY.
05-61A-2126-1 4035 RELAY, K1 FAILS OPEN WHILE IN USE.
05-61A-2126-2 4036 RELAY, K1 FAILS CLSD, APPL UNTIMELY PNR.
05-61A-2126-1 4037 RELAY, K2 FALLS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOY.
05-61A-2126-1 4038 RELAY, K2 FALLS OPEN NHILE IN USE.
05-6IA-2126-2 4039 RELAY, K2 FALLS CLSD, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
05-61A-2004-1 4040 FUSE, F26 FAILS OPEN.
05-61A-2004-I 4041 FUSE, F27 FAILS OPEN.
05-6IA-2176-1 4042 RPC 27 OPEN, FALLS TO CLOSE.
05-6IA-2176-1 4043 RPC 26 OPEN, FALLS TO CLOSE.
05-61A-2178-1 4044 RPC 4 OPEN, FALLS TO CLOSE.
05-61A-2179-1 4045 RPC 31 OPEN, FALLS TO CLOSE.
05-6[A-2179-1 4046 RPC 30 OPEN, FALLS TO CLOSE.
05-6IA-2176-1 4047 RPC 28 OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
05-6IA-2176-I 4048 RPC 29 OPEN, FALLS TO CLOSE.
05-6IA-2028-9 4049 SWITCH, S4 POLE-POLE, CONT-CONT SHRT
05-61A-2176-2 4053 RPC 26, OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
05-6IA-2179-2 4054 RPC 30, OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
D-2
APPENDIX D: EPD&C/RMS 05-6[B
NASA FMEA IOA ID ITEM NAME FAILURE MODE
05-6-2658-I 4101 SWITCH, SI OPEN,
05-6-2658-I 4103 SWITCH, $2 OPEN,
05-61B-MPM-2A 4105 SWITCH, S§ OPEN,
05-61B-MPM-2B 4106 SWITCH, $5 FAILS
OS-61B-MPM-2A 4107 SWITCH, $2 OPEN,
05-61B-MPM-2B 4108 SWITCH, $2 FAILS
05-61B-MPM-2B/D 4108 SWITCH. $2 FAILS
05-6%B-MPM-2D 4108 SWITCH, $2 FAILS
05-6IB-MPM-2E 4108 SWITCH, $2 FAILS
05-61B-MPM-2G 4108 SWITCH, $2 FALLS
05-61B-MPM-5 4114 HYB REL, K72 FAILS
05-6IB-MPM-5 4116 HYB REL. K49 FALLS
05-61B-MPM-5 4118 HYS REL, K60 FAILS
05-6)B-MPM-5 4120 HYB EEL, K51 FALLS
05-6IB-MPM-5 4122 NYB REL, K22 FAILS
05"61B'MPM'5 4124 HY8 REL, K62 FALLS
05"61B'NPM'5 4126 HYS REL, K24 FAILS
05"6[B-MPM'5 4128 HYB REL, K$O FAILS
05-6IB-MPM-2F 4176X SWITCH. $2 SHORTS
FAILS TO CLOSE.
FALLS TO CLOSE.
FAILS TO CLOSE DEPL/STOW.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
FAILS TO CLOSE DEPL/STOW.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PUR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY PWR.
TO GROUND
NASA
05-61
05-6!
05-61
05-61
05-61
05-6I
05-6i
05-61
05-6
05-6
05-6
05-6
05-6
05-6
05-6
05-6
05-6
05-6
FMEA
APPENDIX D: EPO&C/RMS 05-61C
IOA ID ITEM NAME
C-MRL-6 4206 HYB REL,
C-NRL-6 4208 NYS REL,
C-MRL-6 4240 HYB REL
C-MRL'6 4242 HYB REL
C-MRL-6 4262 HYB REL
C-MRL-6 4264 HYB REL
C-MRL-6 4284 HYB REL
C-MRL-6 4286 HYB REL
C-MRL-6 4306 HYS REL
C-MRL-6 4308 HYB REL
C-MRL-6 4328 HYB REL
C-MRL-6 4330 HYS REL
C-MRL-2A 4346 SWITCH,
C-MRL-2B 4347 SWITCH,
C-MRL-2D 4349 SWITCH,
C-MRL-2E 4350 SWITCH,
C-MRL-2F 4351 SWITCH,
C-MRL-2G 4352 SWITCH,
FAILURE MODE
K8
K64
K43
K57
)[73
K76
K66
K44
K71
K74
K12
K29
S6
S6
S6
S6
S6
S6
FALLS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSEO, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FALLS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS CLOSED, APPL
FALLS CLOSED, APPL
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED (ON)
PREMATURE CLOSE
CONTACT TO CONTACT
FALLS OPEN
POLE TO POLE SHORT
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
UNTIMELY PWR
SHORT
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NASA FMEA
_PPENDIX D: EPD&C/RMS 05-6ID
IOA ID ITEM NAME FAILURE MODE
05-610-2128-1 4209
05-610-2127-1 4243
05-61D-2126-1 4265
05-6ID-2128-1 4287
05-61D-2127-1 4309
05-6lD-2126-1 4331
05-610-2036-1 4501
05-6lD-2036-2 4502
05-6ID-2031-1 4503
05-61D-2031-2 4504
05-61Do2032-1 4505
05-61D-2032-2 4506
05-61D-2027-1 4507
05-6ID-2027-2 4508
05-610-2033-1 4509
05-6ZD-2033-2 4510
05-6ID-2028-1 4511
05-6ID-2028-2 4512
05-6XD-2034-1 4513
05-61D-2034-2 4514
05-61D°2029-1 4515
05-6ID-2029-2 4516
05-610-2035-1 4517
05-61D-2035-2 4518
05-61D-2030-1 4519
05-610-2030-2 4520
05-6ID-2026-I 4521
05-61D-2003-1 4524
05-6ID-2002-1 4526
05-61D-2003-1 4528
O5-61D-2002A-1 4530
05-61D-2507-1 4532
05-610-2515-1 4533
05-6ID-2507-1 4534
05-6ID-2515-1 4535
05-61D-2507-2 4536
05-6ID-2515-2 4537
05-6ID-2505-1 4538
05-61D-2513-I 4539
05-61D-2505-I 4540
05-61D-2513-I 4541
05-6ID-2505-2 4542
05-6ID-2513-2 4543
05-6[D-2503-1 4544
05-610-2511-I 4545
05-61D-2503-1 4546
05-61D-2511-I 4547
05-6[D-2503-2 4548
RELAY, K44 FAILS
RELAY, K57 FALLS
RELAY, KT7 FALLS
RELAY, K68 FALLS
RELAY, K?8 FAILS
RELAY, K23 FALLS
SWITCH, $21 FALLS
SWITCH, S21 FAILS
SWITCH, $28 FALLS
SWITCH, $28 FAILS
SWITCH, $25 FAILS
SWITCH, 525 FALLS
SWITCH, S32 FAILS
SNITCH, S32 FAILS
SWITCH, S24 FALLS
SWITCH, $24 FALLS
SWITCH, S31 FALLS
SWITCH. S31 FALLS
SWITCH, $23 FAILS
SWITCH, $23 FAILS
SWITCH, $30 FALLS
SWITCH, S30 FALLS
SWITCH, S22 FAILS
SWITCH, S22 FALLS
SWITCH, $29 FALLS
SWITCH, $29 FALLS
SWITCH, $33 FAILS
CKT BRK, CB2? FAILS
CKT BRK, CS29 FALLS
CKT 8RK, CB33 FALLS
CKT RRK, C032 FALLS
PIC 1 FAILS
P C 1 FALLS
P C 12 FAILS
P C 12 FALLS
P C 1, 12
P C I, 12
P C 6
P C 6
P C 17
PC 17
Pie 6, 17
Pie 6, 17
PIC 8
PIC 8
PlC 19
PlC 19
PIC 8, 19
CLOSED.
CLOSED.
OPEN.
OPEN.
OPEN.
OPEN.
LOCKED IN SAFE POS.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY
LOCKED IN SAFE POS.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY
LOCKED IN SAFE POS.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY
LOCKED IN SAFE POS.
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY
LOCKED IN SAFE POS
CLOSED, APPL UNTIMELY
LOCKED
CLOSED,
LOCKED
CLOSED,
LOCKED
CLOSED,
LOCKED
CLOSED,
LOCKED
CLOSED,
LOCKED
ZN SAFE POS
APPL UNTIMELY
IN SAFE POS
APPL UNTIMELY
IN SAFE POS
APPL UNTIMELY
IN SAFE POS
APPL UNTIMELY
IN SAFE POS
APPL UNTIMELY
IN SAFE POS.
OPEN. WILL NOT CLOSE.
OPEN. WILL NOT CLOSE.
OPEN. WILL NOT CLOSE.
OPEN. WILL NOT CLOSE.
TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND OR FIRE.
FALLS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
FALLS TO ARM ANO/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FALLS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
PWR.
PWR.
PWR.
PWR.
PWR .
PWR.
PWR.
PWR.
PWR.
PWR .
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APPENDIX D: EPD&C/RMS 05-61D (Conctuded)
NASA FMEA IOA ID ITEM NAME FAILURE NODE
05-6ID-2511-2 4549
05-61D-2501-1 4550
05-6ID-2509-1 4551
05-6ID-2501-1 4552
05-61D-2509-1 4553
05-61D-2501-2 4554
05-61D-2509-2 4555
05-61D-2506-1 4556
05-6ID-2514-1 4557
05-6ID-2506-1 4558
05-61D-2514-1 4559
05-61D-2506-2 4560
05-61D-2514-2 4561
05-6ID-2504-1 4562
05-6XD-2512ol 4563
05-610-2504-1 4564
05-61D-2512-1 4565
05-61D-2504-2 4566
05-61D-2512-2 456T
05-61D-2502-1 4568
05-6ID-2510-1 4569
05-610-2502-1 4570
05-61D-2510-1 4571
05-61D-2502-2 4572
05-610-2510-2 45T3
05-61D-2500-1 4574
05-6ID-2508-1 4575
05-610-2500-1 4576
05-61D-2508-1 4577
05-61D-2500-2 4578
05-6[D-2508-2 45T9
PIC 8, 19
PIC 10
PIC 10
PIC 21
PlC 21
PIC 10, 21
PIC 10, 21
PIC 2
PIC 2
PIC 13
PlC 13
PIC 2, 13
PIC 2, 13
PIC 7
PIC 7
PIC 18
PIC 18
PIC 7, 18
PIC T, 18
PIC 9
PIC 9
PIC 20
PIC 20
PIC 9, 20
PIC 9, 20
PIC 11
PIC 11
PIC 22
PIC 22
PIC 11, 22
PIC 11, 22
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FIRE.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARN/FIRE.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
FAILS TO ARM/FIRE.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
PIC ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
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APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
023, Analysis of the Remote Manipulator System, (12 January
1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206. Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, _0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/oi/88
RMS/EPD&C
4049
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHORT TO CASE
SWITCH, $4
POLE TO POLE SHORT, CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT,
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IA
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
PANEL A8A2
RMS POWER SWITCH, PRIMARY/OFF/BACKUP
SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POSITION
SWITCH, $4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2S4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE EITHER PRIMARY OR BACKUP 28 VDC AND
115 VAC POWER TO EITHER THE PORT OR STBD REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
LOSS OF POWER TO AN RMS IN USE COULD REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE
RMS IF SAFE JETTISON IS AN OPTION. IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED, LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/10/88
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: RESISTOR, A2R2, A2R3, A3R2, A3R3
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
RMS, 05-6IA
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
PANEL ASA2
STBD & PORT HEATER
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2 WATT
RESISTOR, A2R2, A2R3, A3R2, A3R3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73ASA2A2R2, A2R3, A3R2, A3R3
RWR80SI211FR (4 EACH)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CURRENT LIMITING CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR HEATER INPUT POWER
CONTROL CIRCUITS.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/10/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
RMS/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
4051 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CLOSED
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 1 PH 3A RMS, BACKUP POWER
FAILS CLOSED, FAIL TO TRIPP ON OVERLOAD, PREMATURE
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IA
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
PANEL M73 C
AC SYSTEM 2 POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER, I-PH, 3 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/3 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI9
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR BACKUP AC
POWER (SYSTEM 2) TO THE RMS LOAD PANEL A8AI POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH.
CIRCUIT BREAKER IS NORMALLY CLOSED THUS THE FAILURE COULD
REMAIN UNDETECTED UNTIL POWERDOWN OF CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE •
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/88
RMS/EPD&C
4052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IA
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
MCIU PRIMARY POWER (MN A)
FWD POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, I0 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC4
MC450-0017-II00
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN MCIU BEING CONTINUOUSLY POWERED. THIS IS
THE NOMINAL CONDITION DURING ON-ORBIT PHASE OF FLIGHT.
FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT OPERATIONS OR BE APPARENT ONBOARD.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 26, 27, 28, 29
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IA
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
PORT/STBD HEATER A/B POWER
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC27
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-1200
B [ P ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE HEATER A (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO PORT
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
LOSS OF HEATER POWER B TO PORT MANIPULATOR ARM COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION
COULD RESULT.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS COULD CAUSE FROZEN JOINT WHICH COULG RESULT IN
UNCOMMANDDE MOTION WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/ VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/05/86
RMS/EPD&C
4054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30, RPC 31
OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IA
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
PORT/STBD BACKUP POWER
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, I0 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30, RPC 31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC30, 31
MC450-0017-II00
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BACKUP (28 VDC MN B) POWER TO PORT/STBD REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM PRIOR TO START OF ARM DEPLOYMENT WOULD NEGATE USE
OF ARM THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF BACKUP POWER PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OR WHILE ARM IS IN USE
WOULD ABORT OPERATION OF ARM THUS LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF
BACKUP AFTER LOSS OF PRIMARY WHILE ARM IS IN USE COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF ARM CANNOT BE SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/88
RMS/EPD&C
4175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, S2
PREMATURE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
PANEL A8A2
STBD RMS DEPLOY/STOW
SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED
SWITCH. 2-POLE, 2-POS
SWITCH, $2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
2/2 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: .32V73A8A2S2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO OPERATE THE STOW/DEPLOY
ACTUATOR.
INITIAL FAILURE WOULD BE APPARENT ONBOARD FROM EXTENDED AMOUNT
OF TIME REQUIRED TO STOW/DEPLOY MPM. RMS OPERATIONS CAN CONTINUE
OF SHOULDER HOOK IS ENGAGED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-8
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/88
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM: SWITCH, $2
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL A8A2
4) STBD RMS DEPLOY/STOW
SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED
SWITCH. 2-POLE, 2-POS
SWITCH, $2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A8A2S2
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO OPERATE THE STOW/DEPLOY
ACTUATOR.
LOSS OF OPERATION OF THE STOW/DEPLOY ACTUATOR COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM IF IT CANNOT BE SAFELY STOWED.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE ARM CANNOT BE
SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2124/88
RMSIEPD&C
4177
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTORS, 2W,
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
(6 EACH)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
PEDESTAL DEPLOY/STOW
RESISTORS, CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTORS, 2W, (6 EACH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERVOLTAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POSITION OF PEDESTALS INDICATION.
PEDESTAL POSITION IS NOT USED IN SYSTEM LOGIC CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/88
RMS/EPD&C
4178
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W, (2 EACH)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
SHOULDER POSITION MICROSWITCHES
RESISTORS, CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W, (2 EACH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERVOLTAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE SYSTEM OF STOW/DEPLOY MICROSWITCHES
INDICATING SHOULDER NOT STOWED/DEPLOYED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION. THIS WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR TO RUN UNTIL THE
COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF DRIVE AND POWER SWITCHES WILL ALLOW
CONTINUOUS MOTOR RUNNING TO STALL/BURNOUT RESULTTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE COULD REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE RMS.
IF SAFE JETTISON CANNOT BE PERFORMED THEN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/88
RMS/EPD&C
4179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
SHOULDER POSITION MICROSWITCHES
LIMIT SWITCH, DEPLOY SHOULDER
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERVOLTAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE SYSTEM OF STOW/DEPLOY MICROSWITCHES
INDICATING SHOULDER NOT STOWED/DEPLOYED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION. THIS WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR TO RUN UNTIL THE
COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF DRIVE AND POWER SWITCHES WILL ALLOW
CONTINUOUS MOTOR RUNNING TO STALL/BURNOUT RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE COULD REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE RMS.
IF SAFE JETTISON CANNOT BE PERFORMED THEN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/88
RMS/EPD&C
4180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
SHOULDER POSITION MICROSWITCHES
LIMIT SWITCH, DEPLOY SHOULDER
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FAILURE/DEFLEXTION OF INTERNAL PART, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION /FORIEGN OBJECT /DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE SYSTEM OF STOW/DEPLOY MICROSWITCHES
INDICATING SHOULDER NOT STOWED/DEPLOYED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION. THIS WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR TO RUN UNTIL THE
COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE OTHER DEPLOY MICROSWITCH WILL RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-III74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/88
RMS/EPD&C
4181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
SHOULDER POSITION MICROSWITCHES
LIMIT SWITCH, STOW SHOULDER
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: FAILURE/DEFLEXTION OF INTERNAL PART, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION /FORIEGN OBJECT /DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE SYSTEM OF STOW/DEPLOY MICROSWITCHES
INDICATING SHOULDER NOT STOWED/DEPLOYED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION. THIS WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR TO RUN UNTIL THE
COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE OTHER DEPLOY MICROSWITCH WILL RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/88
RMS/EPD&C
4182
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
SHOULDER POSITION MICROSWITCHES
LIMIT SWITCH, STOW SHOULDER
LIMIT SWITCHES (2 EACH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERVOLTAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE SYSTEM OF STOW/DEPLOY MICROSWITCHES
INDICATING SHOULDER NOT STOWED/DEPLOYED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION. THIS WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR TO RUN UNTIL THE
COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF DRIVE AND POWER SWITCHES WILL ALLOW
CONTINUOUS MOTOR RUNNING TO STALL/BURNOUT RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE COULD REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE RMS.
IF SAFE JETTISON CANNOT BE PERFORMED THEN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/88
RMS/EPD&C
4183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTORS, (16 EACH)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IB
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING MECHANISM
MPM POSITION INDICATION CIRCUIT
ISOLATION RESISTORS
RESISTORS, 5.1 KOHM, 1/4 WATT
RESISTORS, (16 EACH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MPM POISITION INDICATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/lv/88
RMS/EPD&C
4345
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, F3, F4
FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
FUSE, 1 AMP
FUSE, F3, F4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AKA2F3, F4
MC451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE FUSE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO DRIVE ONE
OF THE MRL MOTORS AT EACH PEDESTAL. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF
ASSOCIATED FUSE MAY REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE RMS TO PREVENT DAMAGE
THAT COULD OCCUR FROM UNRESTRAINED RMS DURING ENTRY.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE RMS COULD NOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/zv/88
RMS/EPD&C
4346
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
MRL LATCH/RELEASE SWITCH
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SWITCH, $6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AKA2S6
MC452-0102-70203
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO DRIVE THE MRL CAUSING
POTENTIAL INABILITY TO RELEASE/RESTRAIN THE RMS.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF MRL LATCHES AFTER RMS IS UNCRADLED COULD
REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE RMS.
POSSIBLITY FOR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/17/88
RMS/EPD&C
4347
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $6
FAILS CLOSED (ON)
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
MRL LATCH/RELEASE SWITCH
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SWITCH, $6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AKA2S6
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-70203
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SWITCH IN A CLOSED CONDITION WILL RESULT IN
CONTINUOUS UNCOMMANDED DRIVING OF THE MRL MOTORS. SUBSEQUENT
COMMAND IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF FAILURE WILL ENABLE ALL MOTORS
TO DRIVE LATCH/RELEASE SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN MRL IS IN MID TRAVEL
AND POWER CIRCUITT BREAKERS WILL BE BLOWN. FAILURE WILL
POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO RELEASE
THE RMS OR RESTRAIN AS APPROPRIATE. FAILURE WILL REQUIRE
JETTISON IF MRL LATTCHES FAIL CLOSED AFTER RMS IS UNCRADELED.
THERE IS A
POSSIBLITY FOR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/17/88
RMS/EPD&C
4348
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $6
PREMATURE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
MRL LATCH/RELEASE SWITCH
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SWITCH, $6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AKA2S6
MC452-0102-70203
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN INTERMITTENT OPERATION OF THE MRL DURING
RELEASE OR LATCH OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/17/88
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4349
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM: SWITCH, $6
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
MRL LATCH/RELEASE SWITCH
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SWITCH, $6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 36V73AKA2S6
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-70203
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE CLOSE OF THIS SWITCH WILL ENABLE ALL OF THE MRL
MOTORS TO DRIVE LATCH/RELEASE SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE MRL IS IN
MID TRAVEL.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
DURING ASCENT/ENTRY COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED UNLATCHING OF THE
MRL. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
UNRESTRAINED RMS MOTION.
POSSIBLITY FOR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/iv/88
RMS/EPD&C
4350
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $6
CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
MRL LATCH/RELEASE SWITCH
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SWITCH, $6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 36V73AKA2S6
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-70203
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT IN THE SWITCH WILL RESULT IN
CONTINUOUS UNCOMMANDED DRIVING OF THE MRL MOTORS. SUBSEQUENT
COMMAND IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF FAILURE WILL ENABLE ALL MOTORS
TO DRIVE LATCH/RELEASE SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN MRL IS IN MID TRAVEL
AND POWER CIRCUITT BREAKERS WILL BE BLOWN. FAILURE WILL
POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO RELEASE
THE RMS OR RESTRAIN AS APPROPRIATE. FAILURE WILL REQUIRE
JETTISON IF MRL LATTCHES FAIL CLOSED AFTER RMS IS UNCRADELED.
THERE IS A
POSSIBLITY FOR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/17/88
RMS/EPD&C
4351
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
MRL LATCH/RELEASE SWITCH
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SWITCH, $6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AKA2S6
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-70203
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO DRIVE THE MRL CAUSING
POTENTIAL INABILITY TO RELEASE/RESTRAIN THE RMS.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF MRL LATCHES AFTER RMS IS UNCRADLED COULD
REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE RMS.
POSSIBLITY FOR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/17/88
RMS/EPD&C
4352
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $6
POLE TO POLE SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
MRL LATCH/RELEASE SWITCH
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SWITCH, $6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 36V73AKA2S6
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-70203
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POLE TO POLE SHORT OF THIS SWITCH WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS
UNCOMMANDED DRIVING OF THE MRL MOTORS. SUBSEQUENT COMMAND IN
OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF FAILURE WILL ENABLE ALL MOTORS TO DRIVE
LATCH/RELEASE SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN MRL IS IN MID TRAVEL
AND POWER CIRCUITT BREAKERS WILL BE BLOWN. FAILURE WILL
POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO RELEASE
THE RMS OR RESTRAIN AS APPROPRIATE. FAILURE WILL REQUIRE
JETTISON IF MRL LATTCHES FAIL CLOSED AFTER RMS IS UNCRADELED.
THERE IS A
POSSIBLITY FOR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/99
RMS/EPD&C
4353
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCH - LATCHED & RELEASED
FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
LOGIC CONTROL CIRCUIT
POSITION MICROSWITCHES
LIMIT SWITCH - LATCHED & RELEASED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FAILURE/DEFLECTION OF INTERNAL PARTS, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/FORIEGN OBJECT/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE RELEASED MICROSWITCH INDICATING
PEDESTAL MRL NOT LATCHED OR RELEASED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION.
FAILURE WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR DURING MRL OPERATIONS
UNTIL THE COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF OTHER SWITCH COULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO
MOTOR BURNOUT/STALL. FURTHER FAILURES COULD CAUSE REQUIREMENT TO
JETTISON AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/99
RMS/EPD&C
4354
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCH - RELEASE
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
LOGIC CONTROL CIRCUIT
POSITION MICROSWITCHES
LIMIT SWITCH - RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: FAILURE/DEFLECTION OF INTERNAL PARTS, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/FORIEGN OBJECT/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE RELEASED MICROSWITCH INDICATING
PEDESTAL MRL NOTLATCHED OR RELEASED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION.
FAILURE WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR DURING MRL OPERATIONS
UNTIL THE COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE WILL RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF ABILITY TO UNCRADLE THE RMS.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/24/99
RMS/EPD&C
4355
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCH - LATCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RMS, 05-6IC
MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
LOGIC CONTROL CIRCUIT
POSITION MICROSWITCHES
LIMIT SWITCH - LATCHED & RELEASED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FAILURE/DEFLECTION OF INTERNAL PARTS, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/FORIEGN OBJECT/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ONE RELEASED MICROSWITCH INDICATING
PEDESTAL MRL NOT LATCHED OR RELEASED REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION.
FAILURE WILL ALLOW THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR DURING MRL OPERATIONS
UNTIL THE COMMAND IS REMOVED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF OTHER SWITCH COULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO
MOTOR BURNOUT/STALL. FURTHER FAILURES COULD CAUSE REQUIREMENT TO
JETTISON AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/88 E-27

APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations. Appendix F Legend is as follows:
Code
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8.
9.
I0.
ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Definition
No issue.
IOA concurs with NASA FMEA/CIL and
recommends IOA generate a like FMEA.
IOA recommends that a NASA FMEA be generated for
this failure mode for this component.
IOA concurs with NASA FMEA/CIL and recommends
upgrading the IOA FMEA Crit.
IOA recommends upgrading the NASA FMEA Crit.
IOA concurs with NASA FMEA/CIL and recommends
downgrading the IOA FMEA Crit.
IOA recommends downgrading the NASA FMEA Crit.
Correct the IOA FMEA redundancy screens.
Correct the NASA FMEA redundancy screens.
IOA recommends combining the IOA FMEA Failure Modes.
IOA recommends combining the NASA FMEA Failure Modes.
IOA recommends combining the IOA FMEA Components.
IOA recommends combining the NASA FMEA Components.
Correct typing error in FMEA.
Disregard this FMEA.
This FMEA is not a CIL item.
F-I
EPD&C/RNS APPENDIX F (05-61A)
NASA FNEA TO IDA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I
I DENT l F ! ERS I NASA
................. •1_ .......... ÷ ...... 4" ..........
I I
NASA
FMEA NUMBER
05-6]A-2001-1
05-6IA-2001-1
05-61A-2001-1
05-6IA-2001-2
05-6IA-ZO02-1
05-61A-2002-1
05-61A-Z003-1
05-6IA-2003-1
05-6IA-2004-1
05-6IA-2004-1
05-61A-2006-1
05-6IA-2006-1
05-61A-2006-2
05-6IA-2026-1
05-6IA-2026-1
05-6[A-2026-1
05-6IA-2026-1
05-6IA-2026-2
05-61A-2026-2
05-61A-2028-5
05-6IA-2028-6
ASSESSMENT I CelT I
!OA NUMBER I HW/F I SCREENS
.......... ÷ ...... ÷ ..........
RNS-6031
RMS-4032
RNS-4033
RMS-4051X
RMS-4018
RMS-4019
RNS-4016
RMS-4017
RMS-4040
RNS-4041
RNS-4028
RNS-6029
RMS-4030
RMS-6010
RNS-4011
RMS-4013
RMS-6016
RMS-6012
RMS-4015
RNS-4002
RMS-4006
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R P P P
3/1R P P P
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
2/2
2/2
3/3
2/1R P F P
2/1R P F P
2/1R P F P
2/1R P F P
3/1R P F P
3/1R P F P
1/1
2/1R P F P
I
IOA J RECOMMENDATIONS
...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
I I I
CRIT I I RESOLUT!ON I
HM/F J SCREENS I CODES IISSUE
...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
212
2/1R
313
313
2/2
2/1R
212
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
212
2/1R
3/3
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/2
2/2
1/1
3/3
I NA NA
I NA NA
I NA NA
I NA NA
I NA NA
NA NA
P P
P P
P P
P P
0, 9, 11
2, 9, 11
0
0, 1, 16,
0, 5, 11
4, 7
O, 9, 11
0, 3
0, 3. 11
0, 3, 11
0, 11
2, 9, 11
O, 15
0, 7, 11
0, 7, 11
0, 7, 11
0, 7, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 7, 11
0
O, 3
15
.................. ÷ .......... 4" ...... 4" ......... 4. ...... 4- ......... ÷ ................. 4- .......
F-2
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61A Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS
I I
NASA IASSESSMENTI Celt
FMEA NUMBER I[OA NUMBER I HU/F
05-61A-ZO28-9
05-61A-2028-X
05-61A-ZOZS-X
05-6ZA-ZOZB-X
05-61A-Z028-X
05-61A-2029-5
05-61A-2029-5
05-61A-2029-5
05-61A-ZOT6-1
05-61A-2076-I
05-61A-2076-I
05-6iA-2076-I
05-61A-2076-2
05-61A-2078-1
05-6]A-2078-I
05-61A-2078-I
05-6[A-2078-I
05-61A-2126-I
05-6lA-2126-I
05-61A-2126-I
05-61A-2126-I
RNS-4049X
RMS-4001
RMS-4003
RMS-4004
RMS-4005
RMS-4007
IRMS-4008
RMS-4009
'RMS-4020
RMS-4021
RMS-4022
RNS-4023
RMS-4OSOX
RMS-4024
RMS-4025
RMS-4026
RMS-4OET
RMS-4034
RMS-4035
RMS-4037
RMS-4038
111
/
/
/
/
2/1R
111
111
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
313
313
3/3
3/3
3/3
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
.................. 4. .......... 4- .......
I
NASA I [Ok
.......... ,.I........(... .......
I
J CR|T
SCREENS I HM/F SCREENS
.......... ,,i..... ......... ...
1/1
Z/2
2/2
Z/Z
2/1R 1 NA NA
P F P 2/2
I/I
I/I
P F P 3/2R P P
P F P 3/2R P P
P F P 3/2R P P
P F P 3/2R P P
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/2
2/I R I NA NA
2/2
2/IR 1 P P
......... 4. ...... 4. ..........
RECOMMENDATIONS
.................. ÷ ......
I
RESOLUTION J
CODES IISSUE
.... . .... ° ........ ÷ ......
O, 1
2
Z
2
2
O,
0
0
O,
O,
O,
O,
O,
O,
O,
0
0
0
0
0
0
J, T, 11
3, 7, 11
3, 7, 11
3, 7, 11
1, 14, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
3, 9, 11
3, 9, 11
3, 9, 11
3, 9, 11
................. ÷ .......
1;'-3
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61A Conctuded)
NASA FNEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECONNENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ...............
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA I IOA i RECONNENDATIONS
............................ ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... 4. ......... 4. ................. 4. ......
I I I I
.ASA ASSESSNSNTICRIT I I CRIT I RESo_uTIO.
FNEA NUMBER IOA NUMBER] HM/F I SCREENS I HW/F SCREENS I CODES ISSUE
............................ _ ...... 4. ......... 4. ............... 4. ........................
05-61A-2126-2
05-61A-2126-2
05-61A-2176-I
05-61A-2176-I
05-61A-2176-I
05-6]A-2176-I
05-61A-2176-2
05-61A-2178-I
05-61A-2178-2
05-61A-2179-I
05-61A-2_79-I
05-61A-2179-2
RNS-4036
RNS-4039
RNS-4042
'RNS-4043
RNS-4047
RNS-4048
'RNS-4053X
RNS-4044
!RNS-4052X
RNS-4045
_RMS-4046
RNS-40§4X
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
1/1
3/3
3/1R
3/1R
2/IR
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P P P
P P P
P F P
313
313
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/1R
212
313
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
P P
P P
P P
P P
P F
I NA HA
I NA NA
I F P
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 1
O, 3
O, I, 14, 15
4, 11
4, 11
0, I
.................................................... 4" .................................
F-4
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61B)
NASA FMEA TO IOk WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I
IDENTIF%ERS
I
NASA IASSESSMENT
FMEA NUMBER I]OA NUMBER
05-6]B-MPN-1
05-61B-NPM-1
OS-6IB-NPM-1
05-6%B-HPH-1
05-61B-MPM-2A
O5-61B-MPM-2A
05-61B-MPM-2B
05-61B-MPM-2B
05-61S-MPM-2B,
O5-61B-MPM-2C
05-6IS-MPM-2D
O5-61B-MPM-2E
O5-61B-MPM-2F
!05-61B-MPM-2G
05-6]B-MPM-4
05-61B-MPM-4
05-61B-MPM-4
05-6[B-MPM-4
05-6[S-MPM-4
05-61B-MPM-4
05-61B-MPM-4
RMS-4109
RMS-4110
RMS-4111
RMS-4112
RMS-4105
RMS-4107
RNS-4106
RMS-4108A
D, RMS-4108
RMS-4175X
RMS-4108B
RMS-4108C
RNS-4176X
RMS-4108D
RMS-4113
RMS-4115
RMS-4117
RMS-4119
RMS-4121
RMS-4123
RMS-4125
NASA I IOA I RECOMMENDATIONS
...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
I I I I I
CRIT I I CRXT I I RESOLUTION ]
NW/F I SCREENS I "u/e I SCREENS I CODES IZSSUE
....... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
2/1R
2/1R
I/I
111
I/I
3/3
I/I
I/I
2/IR
I/I
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
.................. 4. .......... 4. ......
p P P 3/2R
p P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 2/2
P P P 2/2
P P P 1/1
p P P 1/1
P P P 1/1
P P P 313
P P P 111
P P P I/I
P P P 2/1R
P P P 1/1
p P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
......... ÷ ......
P P
P P
P P
P P
1 P P
P P
P P
P P
P P
P P
P P
P P
Oa
Oo
O,
O,
O,
O,
O,
O,
O,
O°
O,
O,
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
O,
O,
3, 11
3, 11
3, 11
3, 11
3, 11
3, 11
10, 12
10, 12
10, 12
1, 8, 15
10, 12
10, 12
1
10, 12
3, 9 11
3, 9 11
3, 9 11
3, 9 11
3, 9 11
3, 9 11
3, 9 11
F-5
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61B Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOk WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA I fOX I RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
I I I
NASA IASSESSMENT CRIT I CRIT i RESOLUTION
FMEA NUMBER IIOA NUMBER HW/F I SCREENS HW/F I SCREENS CODES ISSUE
................. ÷ ................. ÷ ............... ÷ .................................
05-61B-NPM-4
05-61B-MPM-5
05-61B-NPM-5
05-61B-MPM-5
05-61B-MPM-5
05-61B-MPN-5
OS-61B-MPM-5
05-6 B-NPM-5
05-6 B-MPN-5
05-6 B-NPN-SA
05-6 B-NPM-6
05-6 8-MPN-7
05-6 B-MPM-TA
05-6 S-MPN-8
05-6 B-MPN-8A
05-6 B-MPM-IO
05-6 8-MPM-IO
05-61B-MPM-IO
05-6IB-MPN-IO
05-6IB-MPM-10
05-6IB-MPN-10
RNS-4127
RMS-4114
RNS-4116
RNS-4118
RMS-4120
RMS-4122
RMS-4124
RMS-4126
RMS-4128
RNS-4177X
RNS-4178X
RMS-4179X
RNS-4180X
RMS-4181X
RNS-4182X
RMS-4129
RNS-4130
RNS-4131
RMS-4132
RNS-4133
RMS-4134
3/1R
1/1
1/1
I/1
111
1/1
I/1
1/1
1/1
3/3
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
P P P
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
N g N
N N N
3/2R
1/1
1/1
111
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
111
313
3/1R
3/1R
3/2R
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
P P
I P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
.................. + .......... + ...... + ......... ÷ ...... 4- ..........
O, 3, 9, 11
O, 11
O, 11
O, 11
O, 11
O, 11
O, 11
O, 11
O, 11
O, 1, 8, 15
O, 1
O, 1
O, 1
O, 1
0 1
0 11 15
0 11 15
0 11 15
0 11 15
0 11 15
0 11 15
................. ÷ .......
F-6
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61B Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA
................. 4. .......... 4. ...... ÷ ..........
I I
NASA IASSESS.ENTI CelT
FMEA NUMBER I[OA NUMBER( ff_IF
05-61B-MPM-IO
05-61B-MPM-IO
05-61B-MPM-IO
05-6IB-MPM-IO
05-6IB-MPM-10
05-61B-MPM-10
05-6iB-MPN-10
05-61B-MPM-10
05-6IB-NPM-10
05-6IB-MPM-10
05-61B-MPM-II
RNS-4135 3/3
RMS-4136 3/3
RMS-4137 3/3
RMS-4138 3/3
RMS-4139 3/3
RMS-4140 3/3
RNS-4141 3/3
RMS-6142 3/3
RMSo4143 3/3
RMS-4144 3/3
RMS-4183X 3/3
SCREENS
N N N
N N N
M N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
I
IOA i RECOMMENDATIONS
................ 4. ..... . ........... 4. ......
I I
I RESOLUTION I
SCReeMS ( CODES rISSU_
.......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
CRIT
HUfF
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
....... 4, ......... 4. ...... 4' ..........
O, 11, 15
0, 11, 15
O, 11, 15
O, 11, 15
O, 11, 15
O, 11, 15
O. 11. 15
O, 11, 15
O, 11, 15
0, 11, 15
O, 1, 15
F-7
EPD&C/RNS APPENDIX F (05-6IB Cont'd)
NASA FNEA TO [OA NORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA I IDA I RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... .4" ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ........................
I I I I I I
NASA IASSESSNENTI CRIT I I CRIT J I RESOLUTION
FNEA NUMBER IloA NUMBER I HN/F I SCREENS J HW/F J SCREENS I CODES ISSUE
................. •4" .......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ........................
REFER TO EPD&C BASIC FOR THE FOLLOWING FMEAS
_EPD&C 05-6-2613-I
EPD&C 05-6-2613-1
_EPD&C 05-6-2613-2
EPD&C 05-6-2613-2
EPD&C 05-6-2614-I
EPD&C 05-6-2614-2
EPD&C 05-6-2615-1
EPD&C 05-6-2615-1
EPD&C 05-6-2615-2
EPD&C 05-6-2615-2
EPD&C 05-6-2616-1
EPD&C 05-6-2616-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-1
EPD&C 05-6-2655-1
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPO&C 0S-6-2654-1
RNS-4153 /
RNS-4155 /
RNS-4154 /
RNS-4156 /
RNS-4151 /
RNS-4152 /
RMS-4147 /
RMS-4149 /
RMS-4148 /
RMS-4150 /
RMS-4145 /
RMS-4146 /
RMS-4159 /
RMS-4167 /
RNS-4157 I
RNS-4161 /
RNS-4163 /
RNS-4165 /
RMS-4166 /
RMS-4168 /
RNS-4160 /
3/2R NA NA
3/2R NA NA
313
313
3/2R NA NA
315
3/2R NA NA
31ZR NA NA
3/5
3/3
312R NA NA
3/3
3/2R NA NA
3/2R NA NA
3/2R NA NA
3/2R NA NA
3/2R NA NA
3/2R NA NA
3/3
3/3
3/3
................................... 4- ......... "4"...... .4" .........
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
................. •4".......
F-8
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61B Conctuded)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA J IOA I RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... + ......... ÷ ................. + ......
1 I I I
NASA
FMEA NUMBER
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2653-2
EPD&C 05-6-2654-1
EPD&C 05-6-2655-1
EPD&C 05-6-2655-1
EPD&C 05-6-2656-1
EPD&C 05-6-2658-1
EPD&C 05-6-2658-1
EPD&C 05-6-2658-2
EPD&C 05-6-2658-2
EPO&C 05-6-2703-1
EPD&C 05-6-2703-1
EPD&C 05-6-2704-1
EPD&C 05-6-2705-1
EPD&C 05-6-2705-1
EPD&C 05-6-2706-I
ASSESSMENT
|OA NUMBER
RMS-4163
RMS-4165
RMS-4166
RMS-4168
RMS-4160
RMS-4162
RMS-4164
RMS-6158
RMS-6101
RMS-4103
RMS-4102
RMS-6104
RMS-6172
RMS-4176
RMS-6170
RMS-4171
RMS-4173
RMS-6169
CRIT
NW/F
/
/ 3/2R
/ 3/3
/ 3/3
/ 3/3
/ 3/3
/ 3/3
/ 3/3
/ 2/1R
/ 2/1R
/ 3/3
/ 3/3
/ 312R
/ 3/2R
/ 3/2R
/ 3/2R
/ 3/2R
/ 3/2R
....... ÷ ......... ÷ ......
I CRIT I I RESOLUTION I
SCREENS I H"/F I SCREENS I CODES IISSUE
.......... ÷ ...... + ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
3/2R NA NA 14
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA HA
1 P P
1 P P
14
14
16
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
16
14
14
14
14
14
14
......... 4- ................. + .......
F-9
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-6IC)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA ] IOA I RECOMMENDATIONS
............................ ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
NASA
FMEA NUMBER
05-61C-MRL-I
O5-6IC-MRL-ZA
05-61C-MRL-2B
05-6]C-MRL-2C
05-61C-MRL-2D
05-6[C-MRL-2E
O5-61C-MRL-2F
05-61C-MRL-2G
05-6IC-MRL-4
05-6[C-MRL-4
05-6IC-MRL-4
05-6IC-MRL-4
OS-6IC-MRL-4
O5-6]C-MRL-4
O5-6IC-MRL-4
O5-6IC-MRL-4
O5-61C-MRL-4
OS-6IC-MRL-4
OS-6IC-MRL-4
05-6[C-MRL-4
OS-6[C-MRL-4
ASSESSMENT
]Ok NUMBER
RMS-4345X
RMS-4346X
RMS-4349X
RMS-4352X
RMS-4350X
RMS-4347X
RMS-6368X
RNS-4351X
RMS-4201
RMS-4203
RMS-4205
I I I I I
CRIT I I CRIT I I RESOLUTION I
HW/F I SCREENS I xw/e I SCREENS I CODES I[SSUE
....... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
3/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/3
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
RMS-4207 3/1R
RMS-4235 3/1R
RMS-4237 3/1R
RMS-4239 3/IR
RMS-4241 3/IR
RMS-4257 3/IR
RMS-4259 3/IR
RMS-4261 3/IR
RMS-4263 3/IR
RMS-4279 3/IR
.................. 4. .......... 4- ......
P P P 3/1R
P P P 2/1R
P P P 2/1R
P P P 313
P P P 2/1R
P P P 2/1R
P P P 2/IR
P P P 2/IR
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
P P P 3/2R
......... ÷ ......
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA HA
HA NA
NA NA
NA NA
0 1
0 1 10
O 1 10
O 1 15
0 1 10
0 1 10
O 1 10
0 1 10
O 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
O 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
O 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3 7, 9 11 I
0 3 7 9 11 1
0 3 7 9 11 1
0 3 7 9 11 I
0 3 7 9 11 1
0 3 7 9 11 I
0 3, 7 9 11 I
F-IO
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61C Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I (
IDENTIFIERS J NASA I IOA J RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. + ......
I I I I I I I
NASA IASSESSHENT I CRIT J I CRIT I I RESOLUTION J
FNEA NUNBER IIOA NUMBER] NW/F J SCREENS l HW/F l SCREENS J CODES ]ISSUE
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
RMS-428105-6IC-MRL-4
05-61C-MRL-4
05-61C-MRL-4
05-61C-MRL-4
05-6%C-MRL-4
05-61C-MRL-6
05-61C-MRL-4
05-61C-MRL-¢
05-61C-MRL-6
05-6]C-MRL-4
05-6IC-MRL-4
05-61C-MRL-5
105-6[C'MRL-5
JOS-61C-MRL-S
IO5-6IC-MRL-S
05-61C-MRL-5
05-61C-MRL-5
O5-6IC-MRL-5
05-61C-MRL-5
OS-6IC-MRL-5
O5-61C-MRL-5
RNS-4283
RMS-4285
RMS-4301
RMS-4303
RNS-4305
RMS-4307
RMS-4323
RMS-4325
RMS-4327
RMS-4329
RMS-6202
RMS-4206
RMS-6236
RMS-4238
RMS-4258
RMS-4260
RMS-6280
RMS-4282
RMS-4302
RMS-4304
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
311R
3/1R
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/ZR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
312R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
312e
3/2R
312R
3/2R
3/2R
NA NA
NA NA
MA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
O, 3, 7 9, 11 1
O, 3, 7 9, 11 1
O, 3, 7 9, 11 1
O, 3, 7 9, 11 1
O, 3, 7 9, 11 1
O, 3, 7 9, 11 1
0 3, 7 9 11 1
0 3, T 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 I
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
0 3, 7, 9 11 1
O, 3 7, 9 11 I
O, 3 7, 9 11 1
O, 3 7, 9 11 I
D, 3 7, 9 11 I
O, 3 7, 9 11 I
O, 3 7, 9 11 I
O, 3 7, 9 11 1
............................ 4- ...... 4- ............... 4- ........................... + .......
F-II
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61C Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
................................................................. . ...... ÷ ..............
I I I
IDENTIFIERS ] NASA J iOA J RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... + ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ...... + ......... + ......................
I I I I I
NASA IASSESS"ENT CRIT I I CRIT I I RESOLUTION
FMEA NUMBER JIOA NUMBER HW/F J SCREENS I HM/F I SCREENS J CODES ISSUE
................. ÷ ................. 4. ......... ÷ ...... 4. ......... ÷ ......................
05-6IC-MRL-5
05-61C-NRL-5
O5-6%C-NRL-6
O5-6IC-NRL-6
05-61C-NRL-6
O5-6[C-MRL-6
O5-6%C-NRL-6
OS-6IC-NRL-6
05-6|C-NRL-6
05-6IC-NRL-6
O5-61C-MRL-6
O5-61C-MRL-6
O5-6IC-NRL-6
05-6%C-MRL-6
O5-6IC-MRL-7
O5-61C-MRL-7
O5-6IC-MRL-7
O5-61C-NRL-7
05-61C-NRL-7
OS-6IC-MRL-7
O5-6IC-NRL-7
RNS-4324
RNS-4326
RNS-4206
RNS-4208
RNS-4240
RNS-4262
RNS-4262
RNS-4264
RNS-4284
'RNS-4286
RNS-4306
RNS-6308
RNS-4328
RNS-4330
RNS-4217
RNS-4218
RMS-6251
RNS-6252
RNS-6273
RNS-4274
RNS-6295
3/1R
3/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
P P P
P P P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
gk NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA'
NA NA
Nk NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA HA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
O, 3, 7, 9, 11 1
O, 3, 7, 9, 11 1
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7 9, 11
O, 3, 7 9 11
O, 3, 7 9 11
O, 3, 7 9 11
0 3, 7 9 11
0 3, 7 9 11
0 3, 7 9 11
0 3, 7 9 11
0 3, 7 9 11
0 3, 7 9 11
.................. 4. .......... ÷ ...... 4, ........................................... + ......
F-12
EPD&C/RNS APPENDIX F (05-6IC Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOA MORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
I I
IDENTIFIERS NASA J %OA I RECOMNENDATIONS
................. ÷ ................ ÷ ......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. + ......
I I I
NASA ASSESSMENT CRIT J CR%T J RESOLUTION J
FMEA NUMBER IOA NUMBER HM/F J SCREENS HW/F I SCREENS CODES IISSUE
................. . ................ ÷ ....... . ....... ÷ ........................... ÷ ......
05-61C-MRL-7
05-61C-MRL-7
05-61C-MRL-7
05-61C-MRL-7
05-61C-MRL-7
05-61C-MRL-TA
05-6IC-MRL-TA
O5-61C-MRL-TA
05-6IC-MRL-TA
O5-6IC-MRL-TA
O5-6IC-MRL-TA
05-6IC-NRL-TA
05-61C-MRL-TA
05-6|C-MRL-7A
05-6%C-MRL-TA
IO5-6IC-MRL-TA
05-6ZC-NRL-TA
05-61C-NRL-8
05-6IC-MRL-9
05-61C-MRL-IO
05-6IC-MRL-II
RMS-4296
RNS-4317
RMS-4318
RMS-4339
RMS-4340
RMS-4211
RMS-4212
RMS-4245
RNS-4266
RMS-4267
RMS-6268
RNS-4289
RMS-4290
RMS-4311
RMS-4312
RMS-4333
RMS-4334
RM5-4628
RMS-4429
RMS-4630
RM5-4219
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/2R
3/1R
3/3
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
N N N
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
313
313
313
313
313
313
313
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
I P P
I P P
I P P
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9, 11
O, 3, 7, 9 11
O, 3, 7, 9 11
O, 3, 7, 9 11
O, 3, 7, 9 11
0 3, 7, 9 11
0 3, 7, 9 11
O 3, 7, 9 11
0 3, 7, 9 11
0 I
0 I
0 I
0 9, 11, 15
.................. 4" .......... 4- ...... 4" ......... 4" ................ 4- ................. 4- .......
F-13
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-6IC Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOA UORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA J IOA I RECOMMENDATIONS
NASA
FMEA NUMBER
O5-6IC-MRL-11
O5-61C-MRL-II
05-61C-MRL-II
O5-6IC-MRL-II
05-6IC-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-I1
05-61C-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-II
O5-61C-MRL-I1
O5-61C-MRL-I1
05-6IC-MRL-II
05-61C-MRL-II
05-61C-MRL-II
05-61C-MRL-II
O5-61C-MRL-II
05-61C-MRL-II
05-6[C-MRL- 11
05-61C-MRL-I1
05-61C-MRL-I1
05-6IC-MRL-11
05-6IC-MRL-II
........... ÷ ...... + ......... ÷ ......
I I I
ASSESSNENTI CRIT I I CelT
IOA NU"SER I .W/F I SCREENS I "W/F
........... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ......
RMS-4220
RNS-4221
RMS-4222
RMS-4223
RMS-4224
RMS-4225
RMS-4226
RNS-4227
RMS-4228
RMS-4229
RNS-4230
313
313
313
313
313
3/3
3/3
313
313
313
313
RMS-4231 313
RMS-4232 313
RMS-4233 313
RMS-4234 313
RMS-4253 313
RMS-4254 313
RMS-4255 313
RMS-4256 3/3
RMS-4275 3/3
RMS-4276 3/3
.................. ÷ .......... ÷ .......
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
I I
I RESOLUTION I
SCREENS I CODES IISSOE
......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
O# 9 e
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
9,
9,
9,
9,
11, 15
11, 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
......... ÷ ...... 4- ......... 4- .................
F-14
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61C Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO ]OA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ 4. ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA [ IOA J RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... 4. ...... 4. ......... 4. ......
I I I I
NASA IASSESS"ENTI CRIT I I CelT
FNEA NUMeER IIOA NUNSER I .W/F I SCREENS I HWIF
................. 4. .......... 4. ...... 4. ......... 4. .......
05-61C-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-11
05-6[C-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-11
05-6IC-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-11
05-61C-MRL-11
05-61C-NRL-11
05-61C-MRL-II
05-61C-MRL-11
05-6IC-MRL-11
05-6IC-MRL-12
05-61C-MRL-12
05-6IC-MRL-12
05-61C-MRL-12
05-61C-MRL-12
05-6IC-MRL-12
105-6IC-MRL-12
RMS-4277
RMS-4278
RMS-4297
RMS-4298
RMS-4299
RMS-4300
RMS-4319
RMS-4320
eNS-4321
RMS-6322
RMS-4341
'RMS-4342
RNS-4343
RNS-4344
eMS-4213
RMS-4214
eMS-4215
RMS-4216
RMS-424T
RMS-4248
RMS-4249
.................. 4- ..........
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
313
3/3
3/3
313
3/3
3/3 N N N
3/3 N N N
3/3 N N N
3/3 N N N
3/3 N N N
3/3 N N N
313 N N N
...... •4- .........
313
3/3
313
3/3
3/3
313
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
313
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
SCREENS
....... =.÷ ................. 4. ......
RESOLUTION
CODES ISSUE
........................
Oe 9s
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
Oo 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
O, 9,
0 9,
0 9,
0 9,
0 9,
0 9,
0 9,
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11, 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
11 15
....... 4. ......... 4. ................. + .......
F-15
EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-6IC Conctuded)
NASA FNEA TO ]OA UORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA J IOA J RECONNENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... 4. ................ 4. ...... 4. ......... 4. ................. 4. ......
I I I I
NASA JASSESSNENT CRIT J CRIT J RESOLUTION J
FMEA NUMBER JlOA NUMBER HW/F SCREENS J HM/F SCREENS J CODES IISSUE
................. 4. ........................... 4. ................ ÷ ................. 4. ......
05-61C-NRL-12
05-6IC-MRL-12
05-6IC-NRL-12
05-6[C-MRL-12
05-6]C-MRL-12
05-6IC-NRL-12
05-61C-NRL-12
05-6IC-NRL-12
OS-6IC-NRL-12
05-6 C-MRL-12
05-6 C-NRL-12
05-6 C-NRL-12
05-6 C-NRL-12
05-6 C-MRL-12
05-6 C-MRL-12
05-6 C-MRL-12
05-61C-MRL-12
IRMS-4250
RNS-4269
RMS-4270
RMS-4271
RMS-6272
RMS-4291
RMS-4292
RNS-4293
RNS-4294
RMS-4313
RMS-4316
RMS-4315
RNS-4316
RMS-4335
RMS-4336
RMS-4337
RMS-4338
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
N N N 3/3
N g N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
N N N 3/3
...... 4- ......... 4. ...... 4. .........
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
O, 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11 15
0 9, 11, 15
0 9, 11, 15
0 9, 11, 15
0 9, 11, 15
O, 9, 11, 15
O, 9, 11, 15
................. ÷ .......
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EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61D1)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSNEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA I IDA I RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... + ...... + ......... ÷ ................. + ......
I
NASA ASSESSMENT I CRIT
FMEA NUMBER IOA NUMBER I HW/F
........................... ÷ ......
05-61D-2002-I
05-61DU2002A-1
05-6[D-2026-I
05-61D-2027-I
05-61D-2027-2
05-61D-2028-1
05-61D-2028-2
05-610-2029-I
05-610-2029-2
05-61D-2030-1
05-61D-2030-2
05-61D-2031-I
05-61D-2126-I
05-610-2126-I
05-6|0-2127-I
05-6ID-2127-I
05-61D-2128-I
05-61D-2128-I
05-610-2500-I
05-610-2500-I
05-6[D-2501-I
RMS-4526
RMS-4530
RMS-4521
RMS-4507
RMS-4508
RMS-4511
RMS-4512
RNS-4515
RMS-4516
RMS-4519
RMS-4520
RMS-4503
RMS-4265
RMS-4331
RMS-4243
RMS-4309
RMS-4209
RMS-4287
RMS-4574
RMS-4576
RMS-4550
1/1
2/1R
1/1
1/1
2/1R
1/1
2/1R
1/1
2/1R
1/1
2/1R
111
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
I I I I
I CRXT I I RESOLUTION I
SCREENS I HW/F I SCREENS I CODES IISSUE
.......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
P F
P F
P F
P F
P F
P P
P P
P P
P P
P P
P P
P F
P F
P F
2/IR
P 2/IR
313
I/I
P 2/IR
111
P 2/IR
I/1
P 211R
I/I
P 2/IR
I/I
P 3/2R
P 3/2R
P 3/2R
P 3/2R
P 3/2R
P 3/2R
P 2/IR
P 2/IR
P 2/IR
1 P
1 P
1 P
P P
P P
1 P P
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA HA
NA NA
NA NA
P P
P P
P P
P O, 3, 11
P O, 7, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 11
P O, 7, 11
O, 11
0, 7, 11
O, 11
O, 7, 11
O, 11
0 7, 11
0 11
0 3, 7, 11
0 3, 7, 11
0 3, 7, 11
0 3, 7, 11
0 3, 7, 11
0 3, 7, 11
0 7, 11
0 7, 11
0 7, 11
.................. 4" .......... 4" ...... "t" ......... ÷ ...... 4" ......... 4- ................. 4" .......
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EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-61D1 Conctuded)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ...............
I I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA I IOA l RECOMMENDATIONS
NASA
FMEA NUNBER
05-610-2501-I
05-61D-2502-I
05-61D-Z502-1
05-61D-2503-I
05-61D-2503-I
05-61D-2504-I
05-61D-2504-I
05-61D-2505-I
05-61D-2505-1
05-61D-2506-1
05-61D-2506-1
05-61D-2507-1
05-61D-2507-1
I I I
ASSESSNENTI CRIT I I CRIT
XOA NUMBER I HW/F J SCREENS I HW/F
........... @ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ......
RNS-4552
RNS-4568
RMS-4570
RNS-4544
RMS-4546
RMS-4562
RNS-4564
RNS-4538
RNS-4540
RMS-4556
RMS-4558
RMS-4532
RNS-4534
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
......... ÷ ................. + ......
I I
I RESOLUTION I
SCREENS l CODES I ISSUE
......... ÷ ................. ÷ ......
O, 7, 11
O, 7, 11
O, 7, 11
O, 7, 11
O, 7, 11
O, 7, 11
O 7, 11
11
11
11
11
11
11
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
0 7,
0 7,
O 7,
O 7,
0 7,
0 7,
.................. 4. .......... + ...... '4. ....... ,-+ ...... 4. ......... + .................
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EPO&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-6ID2)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
.................... . ...... o .................................... o ....... ÷o ...............
I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA lOk I RECOMNENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... _ .......................... + ................. + ......
I I I
NASA IASSESSMENT CRIT I CRIT RESOLUTION J
FMEA NUMBER IIOA NUMBER HW/F I SCREENS HW/F SCREENS CODES IISSUE
...o ............. _ ............... ..÷ .... ° ...... ... .... , ....... ° ...... ... ....... ÷ ......
'RMS-452305-61D-ZOO1-1
05-61D-2002-2
05-6ID-2002-2
05-61D-2003-1
05-6ZD-2003-1
05-61D-2003-2
05-61D-2003-2
05-610-2026-2
05-6ID-2031-2
05-610-2032-1
05-6ID-2032-2
05-61D-2033-1
05-6ID-2033-2
05-610-2034-1
05-6[D-2034-2
05-61D-2035-I
05-61D-2035-2
05-6ID-2036-I
05-6ZD-2036-2
05-61D-2129-I
05-61D-2129-I
RMS-4527
;RMS-6531
RMS-4524
RMS-4528
RMS-4525
RMS-6529
RMS-4522
RMS-4504
RMS-4505
RMS-4506
RMS-4509
RMS-6510
RMS-4513
RMS-4514
RMS-4517
RMS-4518
RMS-6501
RMS-4502
RMS-4266
RMS-4332
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
2/1R
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/1R
1/1
3/1R
1/1
3/1R
1/1
3/1R
1/1
3/1R
1/1
3/1R
3/3
3/3
NA NA NA
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
NA NA NA
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
2/1R
3/3
3/3
3/2R
2/1R
1/1
2/1R
1/1
2/1R
1/1
2/IR
I/I
2/IR
I/I
2/1R
3/2R
3/2R
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 NA NA
1 NA NA
O, 13, 15
O, 11, 15
O, 11, 15
O, 11
O, 11
O, 11, 15
O, 11, 15
O, 11
O, 5, 11
O, 11
O, 5, 11
O, 11
O, 5, 11
O, 11
O, 5, 11
O, 11
O, 5, 11
O, 11
O, 5, 11
4, 7, 11, 15
4, 7, 11, 15
............................ 4. ...... 4- ............... ÷ ......... + ................. + .......
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EPD&C/RMS APPENDIX F (05-6ID2 Cont'd)
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ...............
I I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA J IOA RECOMMENDATIONS
................. + .......... + ...... ÷ ......... + .......
I I I
NASA ASSESS.ENTI CRIT I I CRIT
FNEA NUMBER IOA NUMBER I HW/F I SCREENS I HW/F
............................ ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ ......
05-61D-2130-1
05-61D-2130-1
05-61D-2131-1
05-61D-2131-1
05-61D-2500-2
05-61D-2501-2
05-61D-2502-2
05-61D-2503-2
05-6ID-2504-2
05-61D-2505-2
05-6ID-2506-2
05-6ID-2507-2
!05-61D-2508-I
05-61D-2508-1
05-61D-2508-2
05-61D-2509-I
05-61D-2509-I
05-610-2509-2
05-6iD-2510-I
05-6i0-2510-I
05-61D-2510-2
RNS-4244
RMS-4310
RMS-4210
RNS-4288
RMS-4578
RMS-4554
RNS-4572
RNS-4548
RNS-4566
RNS-4542
RNS-4560
RMS-4536
RMS-6575
P
RMS-4577
RMS-4579
RMS-4551
RNS-4553
RMS-4555
RNS-4569
RMS-4571
RMS-4573
.................. 4. ..........
3/3 P P p
3/3 P P p
3/3 P P p
3/3 P P p
3/1R P P e
3/1R P P p
3/1R P NAP
3/1R P P p
3/1R P P p
3/1R P P p
3/1R P P P
3/1R P P P
2/1R P NAP
2/1R P NAP
3/1R P p p
2/1R P P p
2/1R P NAP
3/1R P P P
2/1R P NAP
2/1R P NA P
3/1R P P p
...... ÷ .........
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
........................... ÷ ......
RESOLUTION
SCREENS CODES ISSUE
..................................
1 NA NA
1 NA NA,
1 NA NA
1 NA NA
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
4, 7, 11, 15
4, 7, 11, 15
4, 7, 11, 15
4, 7, 11, 15
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
D, 3, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 3, 11
...... ÷ ......... 4- ................. 4- .......
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EPD&C/RM$ APPENDIX F (05-6102 Conctuded)
NASA FMEA TO ]OA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
........................................................................ ÷ ................
S I
IDENTIFIERS I NASA J IOA RECOMMENDATIONS
................. ÷ .......... ÷ ...... ÷ ......... ÷ .................................. ÷ ......
I I I I
NASA JASSESSMENT CRIT I I CRIT RESOLUTION J
FMEA NUMBER IIOA NUNBER HM/F ] SCREENS I NM/F SCREENS CODES Izssue
................. ÷ ................. ÷ ......... ÷ .................................. + ......
RMS-454505-610-2511-1
05-6%D-2511-1
05-61D-2511-2
05-61D-2512-1
05-61D-2512-1
05-61D-2512-2
05-61D-2513-1
05-6ID-2513-1
05-61D-2513-2
05-61D-2514-I
05-61D-2514-I
05-61D-2516-2
05-61D-2515-I
05-61D-2515-I
05-61D-2515-2
RMS-4547
RMS-4549
IRMS-4563
RMS-4565
RMS-4567
RMS-4539
RMS-4541
RMS-4543
RMS-4557
RMS-6559
RMS-4561
RMS-6533
RMS-4535
RMS-4537
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
2/1R
2/IR
3/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
P HA P
P HA P
P P P
P NA P
P NA P
P P P
P HA P
P NA P
P P P
P HA P
P NA P
P P P
P HA P
P NA P
P P P
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
"1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
1 P P
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
O, 3, 11
O, 7, 8, 11
Oo 7. 8, 11
O, 3. 11
O. 7, 8, 11
Oo To 8, 11
O, 3, 11
.................. ÷ ................. 4,' ......... 4" ...... 4" ......... 4, ................. "#, .......
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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the EPD&C/RMS FMEA CIL
VE SUMMARY
/_Th_?_n_l Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in_
( June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of }
the Failure Modes and Effects al sis (FMEA) and Critical Items J
• t (CIL). ' the STS 0rbi_
• " rules define i °
_xxr_PreDaration of _n_A and CIL,_cbcr !qe6 - _
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical
Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)/Remote Manipulator System
(RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential
critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the
EPD&C/RMS hardware initially generated2&4_aa hundred ai_d _ty
-__345_failure mode worksheets and identified one _undred _nd
_sw_z_n-_ll7_Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting
the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to
the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of _n_ h-_d_ad and thirty
_we_132/WFMEAs and__-_-_66_CIL items__
_er_t_ f_i!ur_ m_de analy_i_ .._k_h_tJ fer beth _ert and
i
I
I
I
I
I
c
_alysls was performed component level for
reference )r numbers on the drawings
onent per workshee NASA analysis was perfo
)le s on one FMEA. In cases
were gen for .... entire circuit wi" out
:ily specif_.ng the components included _ e circuit
ny %:ificatio_ number, thus direct comparis _ s of the IOA
ASA _ _ses we _ not meaningful i_the sen;_/ _ numbers of
ailures a :ification of critic_lities _h : have any
y :ts to compare the tw_ _ses required
_f components in all but cases where the
were point failure items as ome of the switches
found t _e. Twenty-eight (28) a( IOA failure moc
_sis wo_ :ets were generated to :ate comparison.
compl_ f the assessment, (5) ssue items were
FMEA
th,
critical where
g d for that ,re mode of
NASA cality for failure
be There also six (6)
recommends of the NASA
are not list candidates.
recommends th
component or
that
_ues identifi
criticality
1
_Y
nd

Some of the s arose du to differences between the NASA
and IOA FMEA/CIL _tion in_ ions. NASA had used an
older ground rules nt whi has since been superseded by
the NSTS 22206 used by After comparison, there were no
other discrepancies found were not already identified by
NASA, and the remaining may be attributed to differences
in ground rules.
It may be noted that numeric
charts and tables. Figure
5 issues for FMEAs and 5
are also CIL issues. Figu
lists 6 FMEA issues which
appear to disagree between
,te Manipulator Arm" block lists
CIL items. The FMEA issues
1 "A] Shoulder Jettison" block
not cc sidered critical items.

